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MISSING DECISIONS
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Significant numbers of federal appellate decisions are missing from Westlaw and
Lexis. Bloomberg Law has similar, and similarly incomplete, coverage. Across most of
the circuits, at least twenty-five percent or more of the courts’ self-reported merits
terminations, which predominately include unpublished decisions, never make their
way to these databases.
Since at least 2007, when a rule change permitted citation to unpublished
decisions from the federal appellate courts, scholars widely have assumed that
commercial databases for legal research capture nearly all—if not, in fact, all—
federal appellate merits decisions whether designated for publication in the Federal
Reporter or not. Although scholars have long considered how publication practices
shape access to court decisions—especially at the district court level—this is the first
work to analyze and document widespread shortcomings of commercial database
access to unpublished federal appellate decisions.
Unraveling the widely held assumption of access raises concerns over our ability to
navigate and uncover useful precedent and to determine basic information about how
the federal system administers justice. The solution is as simple as it is
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transformational: all final judge-issued decisions from the federal appellate courts
should be publicly and freely accessible on court websites. The courts themselves must
be responsible for this change. How they issue decisions is the likely cause of missing
decisions, and market pressures may not create sufficient incentive for private actors—
the databases themselves—to undertake the steps necessary to recover what’s missing.
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INTRODUCTION
This is the story of Jones v. Gelb.1 Antonio Jones alleged that a corrections
officer used pepper spray on him multiple times while Mr. Jones was already
subdued; he was seated on the ground in full leg and arm restraints and had
just undergone knee surgery.2 The officer told Mr. Jones he wanted him to
“die quick[ly].”3 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
a video was consistent with Mr. Jones’s description of the events but was not
conclusive; on appeal, that court vacated the summary judgment decision
granting the officer qualified immunity.4 In ruling for Mr. Jones, the First
Circuit cited law from other circuits to support its conclusion that a jury could
No. 15-1680 (1st Cir. Mar. 23, 2017) (on file with author).
Id., slip op. at 2.
Id.
Id. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to another officer who had used “de
minimis force” on Mr. Jones during the same incident, other officers for their involvement in a
separate incident, and a nurse who had not been “properly served or identified.” Id. at 3.
1
2
3
4
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decide the officer had acted maliciously and therefore was not entitled to
immunity from trial.5 Jones arguably makes new law—or at least clarifies
existing law—in the First Circuit.6
And yet you will not find Jones on Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg Law.7
Jones is not an exception—at least not in that respect. (It is an exceptional
result for a prisoner pursuing a civil rights claim.8) For more than a decade,
federal appellate courts have been screening—wittingly or not—thousands of
decisions like Mr. Jones’s case from the bench and bar. The decision in Mr.
Jones’s pro se appeal is just one example of what’s missing.
There were nearly 10,000 federal appellate “merits terminations”—a term
explained and defined in Part I9—issued during the same twelve-month
period that, like Mr. Jones’s, never made it to Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg
Law.10 Out of approximately 34,000 such decisions issued during that period,
approximately twenty-seven percent are missing from the most popular and
powerful commercial legal databases.11
That time period is not an aberration. Access to merits terminations in
federal appellate proceedings has been poor—or, at best, inconsistent—for at
least the last decade.12 Depending on the year, as many as forty percent of
merits terminations from the federal appellate courts are missing from
commercial databases. The First Circuit is not an outlier, either. Although
the First Circuit’s coverage gap is among the most substantial, during the
same period the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Sixth
Circuit both had coverage gaps similar to that of the First Circuit.13
5 Id. at 2-3 (citing Tenth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit precedent); see also infra
notes 176–179 and accompanying text (discussing skewing effects of missing decisions on civil rights
law in particular).
6 See infra notes 174–175 and accompanying text (discussing cases decided after Jones).
7 Jones is available, as are all “missing decisions,” on PACER, the federal courts’ publicly
accessible electronic docketing system. For more on the PACER system, see infra note 67 and
accompanying text (discussing problems with PACER).
8 Nationally, less than five percent of “private prisoner” appeals (a category that includes nonfederal
prisoners like Mr. Jones) were reversed during the same twelve-month period. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.B-5 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 JUDICIAL
BUSINESS]; see also id. tbl.B-1A (expanding on category of “private prisoner” petitions). The Administrative
Office classifies decisions affirmed in part and reversed in part as “affirmed.” Id. tbl.B-5 n.1. The First Circuit
did not reverse or remand any other state prisoner’s appeal during the same period. Id. tbl.B-5. All
Administrative Office data tables discussed in this Article may be found on the Administrative Office
website. Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseloadstatistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/SL2J-M34W].
9 See infra notes 73–82 and accompanying text (explaining and defining “merits terminations”).
10 See infra Table 1.
11 See infra Figure 1. Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law, in contrast, are among the “most
trusted” legal commercial databases. Paul Hellyer, Evaluating Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite for Case
Validation Accuracy, 110 L. LIBR. J. 449, 449 (2018).
12 See infra Appendix A (collecting data on missing decisions dating back to September 30, 2008).
13 See infra Figure 3.
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Concerns over coverage of federal court decisions on commercial
databases are not new—and there is a rich literature on these issues, especially
at the federal district-court level.14 Christina L. Boyd, Pauline Kim, and
Margo Schlanger’s recent work reveals “vast variation in visibility” into
district court work depending on the research tool used.15 Elizabeth
McCuskey’s earlier work on access to district court decisions identified what
she termed “submerged precedent” at the district-court level—”reasoned
opinions available only on court dockets, and not on the Westlaw and Lexis
commercial databases.”16 Building on McCuskey’s work, Michael Kagan,
Rebecca Gill, and Fatma Marouf challenged assumptions about access to
federal appellate decisions in the immigration context.17 They revealed that
many—if not nearly all—decisions resolving immigration appeals were
missing from Westlaw (and to a lesser extent, Lexis).18
But this Article is the first to show that the problem of access to circuitlevel decisions is much bigger than anyone—including the commercial
databases19—has realized. For at least a decade or more, scholars have thought
(even while questioning district court access) that “[a]ll reasoned [federal]

14 See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Pauline T. Kim & Margo Schlanger, Mapping the Iceberg: The
Impact of Data Sources on the Study of District Courts, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 466, 466 (2020)
(“[T]he work of federal district courts looks different depending on whether research relies on
published opinions, on opinions available on Westlaw or Lexis . . . or on more comprehensive data
available on PACER . . . .”); David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology,
District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 686-88 (2007) (challenging the assumption
that commercial databases provide representative samples of district court decisions); Margo
Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The
Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 153, 158 (2006) (“[E]ven when judges have
written opinions, and allowed those opinions to be published in print or on-line sources, such sources
rarely tell the entire story of a litigation.”).
15 Boyd et al., supra note 14, at 466.
16 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 516 (2016) (evaluating
accessibility of unpublished, yet reasoned district court decisions); see also Peter W. Martin, District
Court Opinions that Remain Hidden Despite a Long-Standing Congressional Mandate of Transparency—
The Result of Judicial Autonomy and Systemic Indifference, 110 L. LIB. J. 305, 313 (2018) (describing the
difficulty in finding these unpublished decisions using the district courts’ websites).
17 See Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill & Fatma Marouf, Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683, 685-86 (2018) (establishing that many—and in some circuits, most—
unpublished decisions in immigration appeals are unavailable on Westlaw and, to a lesser extent, Lexis).
18 See id. at 685 (“[W]e were surprised to find that many cases that PACER showed had been decided
on substantive grounds did not appear when we looked for them in Westlaw or Lexis. . . . Westlaw includes
almost none of them. Lexis is better, but it still is missing large numbers of these cases . . . .”).
19 See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Eric Helland & Merritt McAlister, Measuring How Stock
Ownership Affects Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1183 n.97 (2015) (quoting email from Westlaw Reference Attorney, explaining that “I do not believe there are any U.S. Court of
Appeals decisions that are not on Westlaw in some format, unless there would be some type of court
order sealing it or ordering it not be made public. I would guess this would be a very rare situation.”).
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appellate opinions are open to public view.”20 Although the courts have relied
increasingly on so-called “unpublished decisions”21—decisions not designated
for inclusion in the West Federal Reporter—academics and practitioners alike
have long assumed that unpublished decisions were widely available on free
court websites and in commercial databases.22
The access problems we face for federal district court decisions also exist
at the federal appellate level—albeit to a lesser extent. At no time over the last
decade, have we had complete, navigable access to all reasoned or substantive
decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals on Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg Law,
or FDsys, the only government-run consolidated court opinions database.
What is missing, then? The short answer: decisions from the appellate
courts that are not available for free on court websites. Commercial databases
largely depend on the courts themselves for access to the opinions and orders
that ultimately populate their databases.23 If a decision is not on a free court
website, it likely won’t end up in a commercial database (unless requested for
inclusion by a database customer). “Missing decisions” are available on the
publicly accessible federal court docketing database, PACER, but they are not
available for free. The commercial databases do not routinely incur PACER
fees to retrieve content; whatever appellate work product is locked away
behind PACER’s paywall generally stays that way.
The courts denominate many merits terminations as “opinions of the court,”
a term of art that renders the decisions available for free through PACER,24 but
they issue other terminations—denominated (at least in the First Circuit) as
20 McCuskey, supra note 16, at 517; see also id. (“The current debate at the appellate level no
longer questions public access to unpublished opinions, but now centers on appellate courts’
prerogative to label those opinions prospectively as fit for future precedential use.”); WILLIAM M.
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS IN CRISIS 59 (2013) (“Unpublished decisions are now available online and can be easily
accessed and analyzed there.”); Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65
UCLA L. REV. 808, 810 n.2 (2018) (“Although ‘nonprecedential’ and ‘unpublished’ can be used
interchangeably, this Article prefers the term ‘nonprecedential’ given post-2001 publication of all
opinions in West’s Federal Appendix.”); Robert A. Mead, “Unpublished” Opinions as the Bulk of the
Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, 93
LAW LIBR. J. 589, 595 (2001) (“Because Westlaw, LexisNexis, and court Web sites all include
unpublished courts of appeals opinions in their databases, practitioners and the public now have
access to these opinions regardless of whether they are published in the Federal Reporter.”).
21 Today, approximately eighty-eight percent of merits terminations in the federal appellate
courts are “unpublished.” ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS tbl.B-12 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS].
22 See, e.g., Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent,
4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 18 (2000) (“[T]here is really no such thing as an ‘unpublished opinion’ of a
federal appellate court.”).
23 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 72, 238–244 and accompanying text (discussing written opinion designation
and operation of the E-Government Act). Peter Martin has described this process at the district
court level in detail. See generally Martin, supra note 16.
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“judgments”—that are not available for free.25 How each panel resolves each
appeal—whether by written opinion that will be widely available for free as an
“opinion of the court” or by judgment locked away behind PACER’s paywall—is
a decision left to each panel.26 At least some of these “judgments” (but certainly
not all) are more substantive than the “judgment” label might suggest.27
The discovery of missing unpublished decisions undermines a core
assumption about the study of the federal appellate courts—namely, that we
can easily access and navigate all substantive work of the federal appellate
courts using existing technology. It is not now, and likely never has been, true
that we have usable and navigable access to all of the substantive work of the
federal appellate courts. That’s a concerning discovery for empiricists, who
have been charged with overreliance on published federal appellate decisions
for data and have warned of the pitfalls of failing to account for unpublished
decisions.28 Reliance on commercial databases for unpublished decisions
likewise carries a risk of sampling bias.
For scholars of the federal courts, this Article describes a third tier of
federal appellate decisions that has operated out of sight for well over a
decade. We’ve long understood the federal appellate system to have two
tracks or two tiers: a first for the most “important” federal appellate cases
resolved with published opinions, and a lesser, second tier for common
disputes ending in unpublished decisions.29 But there may be an even lesser,
third tier filled with hidden or missing unpublished decisions that never make
their way to the commercial databases that scholars, practitioners, and courts
use.30 These decisions’ relative invisibility renders them essentially useless to

See infra notes 152–156 and accompanying text (describing First Circuit decisional issuance scheme).
See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b) (“As members of a panel prepare for argument, they shall give
thought to the appropriate mode of disposition . . . . At conference the mode of disposition shall be
discussed and, if feasible, agreed upon.”).
27 Appendix B contains examples of several substantive judgments from the First Circuit.
28 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt
to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899-1900 (2009)
(“The omission of unpublished decisions [from empirical legal analyses] almost surely skews results
in favor of finding greater influence from extralegal factors.”).
29 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275-76 (1996) (describing how
federal appellate triage gives rise to these “different tracks of justice”); see also Penelope Pether,
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 146061 (2004) (explaining the impact of two-tier appellate review system on vulnerable and unpopular
litigants). Note that although some scholars have described the federal appellate justice triage system
as having two “tracks,” I prefer to use the term “tiers,” as it better reflects the reality that some cases
receive far more scrutiny, attention, and judicial effort than others.
30 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing third tier of federal appellate
decisions). Some might conceive of this discovery as providing a greater or deeper understanding
of the content of the second tier. Because of its relative invisibility and the possibility that it includes
25
26
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all but court insiders and the parties themselves—an access and use limitation
that rule changes and technological shifts sought to ameliorate long ago.
For scholars concerned with access to justice, this discovery calls into
question our ability to assess how the federal appellate courts administer
justice. If only three-quarters of the work of the federal appellate courts has
ever been truly visible to us, how can we assess the quality of process and the
even-handedness of treatment that these courts have provided?
More problematic, still, is that what’s missing from commercial databases
appears to include disproportionately appeals from the most vulnerable
litigants—including pro se litigants, criminal appellants, and noncitizens.
Although the litigants themselves receive the decisions that the rest of us
cannot find, the selective issuance scheme may change the shape and scope of
available law. As the Jones case itself highlights,31 some missing decisions may
inform the contours of the duties imposed on defendant state actors—and yet
bench, bar, and the actors themselves do not have ready access to those
decisions for use in future cases. Missing decisions, therefore, may skew the
law itself, depriving litigants of useful precedent and potentially shaping the
contours of a state actor’s constitutional duties. Not all missing decisions are
as consequential as the tableau that begins this piece. But at least some are.
For practitioners and other legal researchers, this Article reveals that we’ve
been lulled into a false sense of transparency and access to precedent by rule
changes and legislation that seemingly ensured navigable access and the free use
of unpublished decisions across the federal appellate courts. We have mistaken
the federal system’s lofty commitment to access with the reality on the ground.
The implications of this work extend well beyond the halls of academia. I
call here on the courts to address this problem, and, in doing so, question the
structure and transparency of basic court processes themselves. Courts have
devolved decisions about access to individual judges or panels—or, perhaps,
individual court clerks—who triage decisions and, in the process, effectively
limit access to those decisions deemed less consequential. The screening may
occur without any awareness of its consequences—that is, without any
awareness that the commercial databases generally do not pay for access to
the less formal types of appellate decisions used to resolve some appeals. But
this Article exposes those consequences and, in so doing, calls for the courts
to change their processes to ensure complete and free access to all final, judgeissued decisions of the federal appellate courts.
This Article begins at the end: Part I explains just how wrong our
assumptions about access to unpublished federal appellate decisions have
decisions of the worst quality in some circuits, I argue here that it represents a class of decisions
deserving its own examination and its own treatment as a third tier.
31 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (discussing Jones).
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been. Part II works through the details of this discovery, providing a deeper
understanding of what appears to be missing from commercial databases by
examining a sample of missing decisions from one circuit. Part III grapples
with the implications of this discovery, including what this work means for
our ability to navigate useful precedent and scrutinize the work of the federal
appellate system. Part IV offers the fix: the federal appellate courts must
transform their processes to make every final judge-issued decision available
on a free and publicly accessible website.
I. ACCESS TO UNPUBLISHED FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS
This Part tells the story of what we thought we knew and what we now know
about our ability to navigate unpublished federal appellate decisions. That story
begins with an explanation of what unpublished decisions we—scholars,
practicing lawyers, the public, and the commercial databases—thought were
navigable and easily retrievable before now.32 Then, to borrow from McCuskey’s
concept of “submerged [district court] precedent,”33 this Part describes what we
now know: there’s a whole lot of submerged appellate precedent, too.34

32 By email or telephone or both, I had conversations with each of the three major commercial
databases discussed here. None of their representatives indicated any awareness of significant
coverage gaps in access to unpublished federal appellate decisions; Westlaw and Lexis, in particular,
indicated they had complete coverage. See E-mail from Sue Moore, Acad. Acct. Manager, Thomson
Reuters, to author (Sept. 4, 2019, 8:58 AM) (on file with author) (relaying information from Amanda
Kenny, Prod. Dev., Thomson Reuters) (“[B]eginning in 2006, there were approximately 300 nonprecedential decisions that were unavailable to Westlaw. The majority of those opinions consisted
of tables without text sent by the 11th Circuit. . . . 2012 was the last year that Westlaw received tables
without text from the 11th Circuit, which was the last court to cease sending such tables. As of 2013,
non-precedential decisions became available from all circuits.”); E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, Prac.
Area Consultant, LexisNexis Legal & Pro., to Patricia Morgan, Professor of Legal Rsch., Univ. of
Fla. Levin Coll. of L. (Oct. 21, 2019, 1:29 PM) (relaying information from Emma Dickinson, Prod.
Manager) (on file with author) (“You should expect to find all US Courts of Appeals opinions online,
including published and unpublished opinions. If we do miss a case, we are always happy to add it
to our database.”); E-mail from Tiffany Lozano, Customer Experience Manager, Bloomberg L., to
author (Aug. 15, 2019, 11:06 AM) (on file with author) (Bloomberg Law has “a more expansive
collection of unpublished decisions within the last 10-15 years.”).
33 McCuskey, supra note 16, at 516.
34 Throughout this Article, I invoke the concept of “precedent” broadly and inclusively. Because
decisions not designated for publication are not binding on other parties and lower courts, they are
usually described as “nonprecedential.” For reasons discussed later, see infra note 38, I think that label a
bit of a misnomer, especially in this context. Although unpublished decisions are neither vertical
precedent nor subject to the prior-panel rule, they are still doctrinally precedential. See McCuskey,
supra note 16, at 519 (using the term “precedent” to refer to “any written decision supported by reasoned
elaboration” and arguing that “[r]easoned elaboration long has been considered precedent’s defining
feature, and supplies a decision’s potential utility in deciding future cases”). But see Kagan et al., supra
note 17, at 690 (stating that McCuskey uses term “precedent more loosely” than other scholars).
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A. What We Thought We Knew
Although the distinction between “published” and “unpublished” decisions
is of relatively recent origin, for a decade or more we generally have thought we
had full access to both types of decisions at the federal appellate level.35 Freedom
of access—and the ubiquity of “unpublished” decisions in essentially “published”
form—had rendered the idea of “unpublished” decisions a “misnomer” to
some.36 This Section will explain how we came to our historical—and now
inaccurate—understanding of access to unpublished decisions.
Before World War II, final decisions in appeals as of right to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals were almost all published in the West Federal Reporter.37 The
category of “unpublished decisions”38 as we know it now didn’t exist until the
mid-twentieth century. That is not to say that every federal appellate decision
always has been published “in the sense of being printed in a book.”39 Indeed,
as one federal appellate court has explained, “there was almost no private
reporting and no official reporting at all in the American states” at the time of

35 The assumption of access likely dates back to circa 2001, when West developed the Federal Appendix,
a reporter which “publishes” unpublished decisions. By then, courts themselves recognized that unpublished
decisions were widely available to lawyers through electronic means. As the Fifth Circuit put it:

[W]hen this court promulgated rule 47.5 [related to citation of unpublished decisions]
in 1995, the relative unavailability of unpublished opinions rendered their use as
precedent fundamentally unfair. Today, however, that proposition is untenable:
“Between Lexis and Westlaw, Internet sites maintained by universities and some of
the circuit courts of appeals, and networks of attorneys practicing in particular fields,
it is the rare opinion that is not disseminated for mass consumption.”
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Boggs & Brooks,
supra note 22, at 18).
36 See, e.g., David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1801-02 (2009)
(describing the “unpublished” moniker as a “misnomer”).
37 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20, at 10-16 (discussing development of limited
publication plans across the circuits).
38 The publication designation identifies inclusion in the official West Federal Reporter.
Publication is significant only because it distinguishes between “precedential” and “nonprecedential”
decisions; only those decisions included in the Federal Reporter are binding precedent. See Scott E.
Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1,
47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 708 (2006). Some scholars prefer the label “nonprecedential” instead of
“unpublished” for this reason and because “unpublished” decisions are thought to be widely available
and usually “published” in less official forms. See, e.g., Beske, supra note 20, at 810 n.2. I, however, will
stick with the term “unpublished” for three reasons. First, it is the term of art used by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
Second, I take a broader view of the meaning of the word “precedent,” and many unpublished
decisions are decidedly precedential for reasons I explain in Part III; hence, I’m uncomfortable
describing these decisions as “nonprecedential.” See infra notes 173–179 and accompanying text.
Finally, as it turns out, a lot of “unpublished” decisions truly are “unpublished” in a meaningful sense.
39 Anasasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054,
1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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our Founding.40 Further, our understanding of precedent was very different in
the eighteenth century than it is today, and reliance on judicial opinions
themselves is a relatively recent invention.41 Publication and precedential status
generally were not linked until the creation of the categorically nonprecedential
unpublished decision in the mid-twentieth century.42
As has been detailed before,43 publication practices began shifting rapidly
during the 1970s and 1980s to address a caseload explosion spurred in part by
the expansion of federal civil rights and criminal laws.44 Overburdened
appellate courts used unpublished decisions—decisions that courts decide in
advance are not binding—to save judicial time.45 If unpublished decisions
make no law, as the courts decreed, then judges need not say much to explain
themselves.46 Judges thought that relieving themselves of any elaborate
reason-giving expectation in easy cases would free up judicial time for hard
cases. To ensure time-saving, not only did courts restrict the precedential value

Id.
See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2001) (“For centuries, the most
important sources of law were not judicial opinions themselves, but treatises that restated the law,
such as the commentaries of Coke and Blackstone. Because published opinions were relatively few,
lawyers and judges relied on commentators’ synthesis of decisions rather than the verbatim text of
opinions.”); id. at 1168 (“The modern concept of binding precedent—where a single opinion sets the
course on a particular point of law and must be followed by courts at the same level and lower within
a pyramidal judicial hierarchy—came about only gradually over the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Lawyers began to believe that judges made, not found, the law.”).
42 See Anasasoff, 223 F.3d at 903 (“Although they lamented the problems associated with the
lack of a reporting system and worked to assure more systematic reporting, judges and lawyers of
the day recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even when they were established only by
memory or by a lawyer’s unpublished memorandum.”).
43 See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 542-48 (2020) (discussing the history of unpublished decisions);
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20, at 3-8 (discussing appellate courts’ caseload explosion); id. at 1021 (recounting the development of limited publication schemes to combat caseload crisis).
44 See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 204 (2001) (demonstrating that by 1985, the courts of
appeals were only publishing 40.6% of their merits decisions).
45 For an early examination of the difficulty of projecting into the future the anticipated
precedential value of court decisions, see generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman,
The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978).
46 “Reasoned elaboration” is the cornerstone of legal process and the creation of precedent.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143-52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An
Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 412 (1978) (“Explanation is normally a condition to
performance of the rulemaking function, since rules ordinarily cannot emerge from an outcome
unless the reasons for that outcome are given.”).
40
41
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of these decisions by deciding not to publish them, but many courts—indeed,
the majority—also prohibited their citation back to the issuing court.47
Unsurprisingly, this time-saving scheme raised a host of serious concerns—
many of which William Reynolds and William Richman chronicled in their
three decades’ worth of work on unpublished decisions.48 In response to that
onslaught of criticism, beginning in 1990 and lasting into the mid-2000s, the
Judicial Conference of the United States49 began exploring a uniform response
to the use of unpublished decisions across the circuits.50 The courts were
overrun with unpublished decisions,51 yet until 2006 there were no uniform
procedures governing their issuance, use, or precedential effect.52
47 Reynolds & Richman, supra note 45, at 1173-81 (discussing so-called “no-citation” rules);
Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm and Drang over the Citation of
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430-31 (2005) (explaining that, before Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, ten of the thirteen circuit courts either forbade citation to
unpublished decisions or discouraged their use).
48 See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20 (summarizing their work on unpublished
decisions in federal appellate courts). The literature raising objections to no-citation rules is significant
and varied; it is also beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Charles L. Babcock, No-Citation Rules:
An Unconstitutional Prior Restraint, 30 LITIG. 33 (2004) (criticizing no-citation rules as “bear[ing] all the
indicia of a prior restraint”); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of No-Citation Rules,
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287 (2001) (suggesting that no-citation rules may interfere with First
Amendment rights of speech and petition); Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power,
and the Constitutionality of ‘No-Citation’ Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037 (2002)
(criticizing the excess discretion awarded to judges to choose not to publish a decision); David S.
Caudill, Parades of Horribles, Circles of Hell: Ethical Dimensions of the Publication Controversy, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1653 (2005) (discussing several concerns related to no-citation rules described as a
“parade of horribles”); see also Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 759 (2008) (“With the availability of unpublished opinions, the original
reasons for no-citation rules no longer justify their continued existence.”); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering,
Legal Fiction of the “Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of
Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 92 (2005) (“The conflicting local rules of the federal circuits
regarding the citation of unpublished decisions raise puzzling questions about whether federal courts
of appeals have a right to prevent attorneys and litigants from referencing opinions that the courts have
no practical ability to keep out of the public eye.”).
49 The Judicial Conference frames policy guidelines for administration of the federal courts. 29
U.S.C. § 331. As the reporter for the Advisory Committee recounts in exceptional detail, the Judicial
Conference initially refused to consider rulemaking in this area—but the issue kept coming up, again
and again. See Schiltz, supra note 47, at 1436-58 (noting persistent opposition to rule-making efforts).
50 These efforts took so long, in part, because the federal appellate bench opposed uniform
rulemaking on unpublished decisions; it routinely objected to efforts to consider predecessor versions of
Rule 32.1, which ultimately was approved in 2006—more than fifteen years after the study began. See
Schiltz, supra note 47, at 1432-58 (discussing history of rule-making efforts related to unpublished decisions
and describing “highly emotional support and opposition” to reform efforts over sixteen-year period).
51 The rate of unpublished cases in 2000 was already almost eighty percent. ADMIN. OFF. OF
THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.S-3 (2000). Today, that rate has risen
to nearly ninety percent. 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
52 Even now, the only court-wide rule on unpublished decisions, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, is meager. Regulation of unpublished decisions has devolved to the circuits
themselves, and the practice is subject to significant circuit-level variation due, perhaps, to circuit-
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Technological innovations—or so we thought—gave the courts a reason
to reconsider restrictions on the use of unpublished decisions; electronic
access and even publication of unpublished decisions had rendered the
moniker “unpublished” a bad fit by the early 2000s.53 Before federal
“unpublished” decisions became widely available, some argued it was unfair
to permit parties to cite them because not every litigant had equal access to
these decisions.54 But in September 2001, West began printing the Federal
Appendix, a publication devoted unironically to “unpublished” decisions from
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.55 Unpublished decisions were also made widely
available by that time through West’s on-line commercial database, Westlaw.56
Equally important, it was thought that any lingering “access” challenges to
federal unpublished decisions would soon be overcome.57 “[A]s of December
specific customs and culture. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and
Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 368-73 (2011) (examining circuits’ different
case-management priorities and how those priorities may affect court processes).
53 Goering, supra note 48, at 34 n.24; see also Levi, supra note 36, at 1801-02 (noting that while
“[b]efore electronic publishing, an unpublished opinion was truly unpublished,” the term had
become “a misnomer given that all opinions are now published and available electronically”); Patrick
J. Schiltz, Comments, in Edward R. Becker, et al., The Appellate Judges Speak, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 4 (2005) (“Of course, the phrase ‘unpublished opinions’ is a misnomer, especially now with the
Federal Appendix, because these opinions are published, not only in the Federal Appendix but in
numerous other sources . . . .”).
Even as early as 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee—a committee convened by
Congress to study the courts—observed that “inexpensive database access and computerized search
technologies may justify revisiting the issue [of the no-citation bans], because these developments
may now or soon will provide wide and inexpensive access to all opinions.” FED. CTS. STUDY
COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 130-31 (1990),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GN7-RCPN].
54 See FED. JUD. CTR., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 18 (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.nonpublication.com/
fjcprelim.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8F5-KXMS] (“A strong historical reason for restricting citation to
unpublished opinions was the fact that many attorneys did not have easy access to them. But now that
so many unpublished opinions are available electronically, this reason appears to have less force.”).
55 See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground
Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 2 (2002) (discussing creation of West’s
Federal Appendix as a “startling action that drains the meaning from the term ‘unpublished’ opinion”).
56 Lexis and Westlaw both had made unpublished decisions available in their courts of appeals
databases “for a number of years” before the Federal Appendix arrived. Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s
Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 475 (2004) (“Westlaw and LexisNexis have, for
a number of years, included unpublished opinions in their federal courts of appeals databases, and attorneys
and other researchers have thus had much greater access to the text of these decisions than in the past.”).
57 There were some anomalous access issues at the time. For example, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits were late to make their unpublished decisions available to the electronic databases. See
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Int. & Intell. Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 42, 46 (2002) [hereinafter Hellman Statement] (statement of
Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law) (discussing
electronic access issues for unpublished decisions). And the Third Circuit, curiously, made available
on its website unpublished decisions in counseled cases only. Id. at 46 n.5. Whether any circuits
continue that practice today is unclear—it is not an issue disclosed in local rules—but it could
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17, 2004,” one scholar wrote at the time, “every federal circuit will be required
to provide the public internet access to all its written opinions, whether
designated for ‘publication’ or not.”58
The reason for the optimism? A little-known law called the E-Government Act
of 2002.59 That promising legislation obligated each federal court, by December
2004, to maintain its own website with “[a]ccess [through that website] to the
substance of all written opinions . . . in a text-searchable format”—“regardless of
whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter.”60 Scholars
were hopeful that the E-Government Act would resolve any lingering access issues
wrought by the move to electronic distribution of court decisions.61
After extensive study and negotiation, in 2006 the Advisory Committee
ultimately recommended—and approved—a rule lifting the restrictions on citation
to federal unpublished decisions that were still in effect in some circuits.62 Under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, no circuit may restrict the citation of any
“federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have
been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not
precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”63
As the advisory committee itself acknowledged, Rule 32.1 is “extremely
limited” in effect; it did nothing to alter the status quo other than to lift all
restrictions on the citation to federal unpublished decisions in federal
account for a significant portion of “missing decisions.” The First Circuit dataset discussed below,
however, suggests that at least in that circuit such an assumption would be both overinclusive and
underinclusive.
58 See Goering, supra note 48, at 34 n.24 (observing that “as of December 17, 2004 . . . every
federal circuit will be required to provide the public internet access to all its written opinions,
whether designated for ‘publication’ or not”).
59 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
60 Id. § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. at 2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note). Specifically, the statute
requires that
[t]he Chief Justice of the United States, the chief judge of each circuit and district and
of the Court of Federal Claims, and the chief bankruptcy judge of each district shall
cause to be established and maintained, for the court of which the judge is chief justice
or judge, a website that contains the following information or links to websites with
the following information: . . . Access to the substance of all written opinions issued
by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official
court reporter, in a text searchable format.
§ 205(a) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note).
61 See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 54, at 18 (“Twelve attorneys mentioned how accessible
unpublished opinions are now, but 14 attorneys said that unpublished opinions are still often less
accessible than published opinions.”); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 105 (1999) (recognizing that approximately one-third
of affirmances in employment discrimination cases were not available on commercial databases in part
because certain circuits “do not make their unpublished opinions available to any electronic source”).
62 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee notes (2006 amendments).
63 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a).

1114

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1101

appellate courts.64 Whether by rule or court decision, unpublished decisions
continue to be nonbinding in every circuit.65 But they are usable—and have
been for over a decade—despite their limited precedential value.
Today, unpublished decisions dominate the output of the federal appellate
courts. Only approximately twelve percent of the merits terminations of the
courts of appeals end in published decisions that bind lower courts and future
litigants.66 Until now, though, we thought we had access to unpublished
decisions in equal measure, thereby making the distinction between the
categories one of precedential effect, not of access. We were wrong.
B. What We Now Know
Neither technology nor the E-Government Act has ensured uniform,
navigable access to all federal appellate decisions (regardless of whether they
are published or not). A sizable portion of the work of the federal courts of
appeals remains locked away behind PACER’s difficult-to-use paywall.67
These decisions are not findable on the appellate courts’ free and public
websites; they, in turn, are not picked up by Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg
Law; and, to make matters worse, courts only sporadically share decisions
64 See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee notes (2006 amendments) (“[Rule 32.1] does
not require any court to issue an unpublished opinion or forbid any court from doing so. . . . It says
nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the unpublished
opinions of another court.”).
65 In every circuit, decisions that are not designated for publication are not binding precedent.
United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2007); Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468
F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006); 1ST CIR. R. 32.1.0; 2D CIR. R. 32.1.1; 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING
PROC. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4; 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b); 8TH CIR. R. 32.1A; 9TH CIR. R. 363(a); 10TH CIR. R. 32.1(A); D.C. CIR. R. 36(e)(2); 11TH CIR. R. 36; 11TH CIR. INTERNAL
OPERATING PROC. 6.
66 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-12.
67 Unless sealed or otherwise protected from disclosure, all documents filed with the courts,
including court orders and opinions, are publicly available on PACER. Frequently Asked Questions:
What Information is Available Through PACER, PACER, https://pacer.uscourts.gov/help/faqs/whatinformation-available-through-pacer [https://perma.cc/6RAZ-PCKE]. But the problems with
PACER are legion. PACER is a difficult, and expensive, system to use. Its fees can be high and
frustrate the goals of public access. See Mackenzie Arthur, Invisible Shackles: The Monopolization of
Public Access Legal Research Due to Government Failures, 19 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 123, 140 (2019)
(“Although case opinions are free, a 10-cent per page fee is imposed by the system for other documents
like pleadings and motions. As such, one can accumulate charges without knowing whether the
document is relevant.”); see also Stephen J. Schultze, The Price of Ignorance: The Constitutional Cost of
Fees for Access to Electronic Public Court Records, 106 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1213 (2018) (“PACER provides no
meaningful mechanism for nonparties to receive notice of new activity on a given case, and it is often
impossible to determine in advance how much the results of a search will cost.”).
PACER also lacks a keyword-search function, indexing, and a multi-jurisdictional search tool
for filed documents. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in
the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 443 (2012) (“[S]earching PACER for legal issues, as
opposed to case-identifying information, is lugubrious.”).
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with FDsys, the only free, consolidated, government-run legal research tool
for federal court opinions.68
All four resources—Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg Law, and FDsys—depend
on the courts themselves for access to judicial decisions. Historically, the
courts sent opinions directly to the databases.69 Now, the databases depend on
public sources—court websites and PACER, primarily—to retrieve federal
court opinions.70 FDsys, on the other hand, receives opinions through a bridge
with the federal courts’ CM/ECF docketing system.71 For the decision to be
received, someone on the court’s side must indicate that the decisions should

68 The rudimentary PACER system is not the only government-run electronic research tool for legal
research. The U.S. Government Printing Office (“GPO”) also runs a database of government documents,
known as the Federal Digital System or “FDsys,” that includes federal court opinions. Amy Pearce,
Goodbye, GPO Access, Hello, FDsys, WYO. LAW., June 2012, at 34, 34. FDsys is available at www.govinfo.gov.
In 2013, the Judicial Conference approved a pilot project to send court opinions directly to the GPO for
inclusion in FDsys. Press Release, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Access to Court Opinions Expands
[hereinafter Access Expands], Jan. 31, 2013, https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/01/31/access-courtopinions-expands [https://perma.cc/4HR7-ZPA2].
Unlike PACER, opinions on FDsys “are text-searchable across opinions and courts.” Id. Indeed,
the Administrative Office lauded the FDsys project as one that would “allow[] the Judiciary to make
its work more easily available to the public.” Id. Within a year, FDsys court participants grew to
sixty-four, and the Administrative Office claimed that more than 750,000 opinions were available on
FDsys dating back to 2004. Press Release, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., 64 Federal Courts Now
Publish Opinions on FDsys, Nov. 13, 2013, https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/11/13/64-federalcourts-now-publish-opinions-fdsys [https://perma.cc/N5FT-D7L5]. Even before that expansion,
according to the Administrative Office, federal court opinions were “already one of the most heavily
used collections on FDsys, with millions of retrievals each month.” Access Expands, supra.
In 2016, FDsys migrated to “govinfo,” “a new, upgraded platform for accessing federal government
information,” that “replicates the functionality and content on FDsys.” Erik Beck, Introducing Govinfo:
A New Source for Federal Government Documents Online, COL. LAW., Feb. 2017, at 73, 73. The improved
platform continues to have coverage gaps, as not all courts have opted into posting opinions on the
GPO system. The appellate courts have opted into coverage, but coverage remains spotty year over
year, as I will discuss in Part II and show in the Appendix. See also Martin, supra note 16, at 315-16
(describing coverage of FDsys as including “all twelve regional circuit courts of appeals”).
69 E-mail from Sue Moore, Academic Account Manager, Thomson Reuters, to Merritt E.
McAlister, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law (Aug. 6, 2019,
10:16 AM) (“Historically, the federal courts of appeals sent or e-mailed decisions to Westlaw for
inclusion in our content.”) (relaying information from Amanda Kenny, Product Developer,
Thomson Reuters) (on file with author).
70 Id. (“Today, however, Westlaw proactively acquires the documents through PACER or court
websites. By obtaining decisions directly from PACER or the court websites, Westlaw is able to
obtain decisions it would not otherwise have had, as well as individual court orders requested by
customers.”) (relaying information from Amanda Kenny, Product Developer, Thomson Reuters) (on
file with author); E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note 32 (“For federal courts, we generally collect
opinions from the court websites or PACER.”); E-mail from Tiffany Lozano, supra note 32 (similar).
71 According to an Administrative Office press release, the GPO system can “pull[] opinions
nightly from courts’ Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) systems and send[] them to
the GPO, where they are processed and posted on the FDsys website.” Access Expands, supra note 68.
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be shared, which requires a CM/ECF user to indicate the decision is a “written
opinion” within the meaning of the E-Government Act.72
What the databases ultimately recover from court websites is a lot less than
what the courts produce—at least, it is a lot less than what the courts say they
produce. Comparing the courts’ self-reported number of “merits
terminations” with the number of database hits during the same corresponding
time period reveals a nontrivial shortfall.73 That shortfall is consistent across
the major commercial databases, but it varies among the circuits—suggesting
that the courts, and not the databases, have disparate practices.
A word about terminology before I proceed further. “Merits terminations”
is a term-of-art used, but not entirely defined, by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts in its statistical reporting.74 Although the Administrative
Office does not define “merits,” “merits” terminations are opposed to
“procedural” ones, which are separately reported.75 “Terminations” count the
“Last Opinion or Final Order,” whether reasoned or not, whether signed by a
judge or not, and whether written or not.76
“Merits terminations” occur in what we might traditionally think of as
“appeals as of right,” as well as proceedings that originate in the appellate
courts themselves, which I discuss below. Appeals as of right are decisions
over which the U.S. Courts of Appeals have mandatory appellate jurisdiction,
including final judgments from the district courts;77 certain orders that are
sufficiently final for purposes of appeal;78 interlocutory orders granting or
denying injunctive relief;79 and appeals from certain administrative agency
decisions.80 Throughout this Article, I will use the term “appeals as of right”
to identify traditional appellate decisions that affirm, vacate, remand, or
reverse district court decisions (or enforce or vacate agency action).
Not all proceedings in the federal appellate courts involve appeals as of right;
discretionary relief is sought in a variety of circumstances, including requests
for permission to appeal and requests for extraordinary relief. The U.S. Courts
of Appeals have discretionary jurisdiction over some nonfinal orders,81 writs,82

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Martin, supra note 16, at 320.
See infra Section II.A (describing data collection efforts).
2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
Id. tbl.B-5A.
Id. tbl.B-12.
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
§ 1292(a).
§ 1296.
§ 1292(b).
§ 1651(a).
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and many habeas corpus proceedings.83 Throughout this Article, I will use the
umbrella term “original proceedings” as a shorthand to refer to discretionary
proceedings not involving mandatory-jurisdiction appeals as of right.
All told, of these “merits terminations” from appeals as of right and original
proceedings, nearly thirty percent remain out of easy reach.84 These decisions are
essentially only usable if we know they exist already and can use certain case
information—for example, a case name or number—to locate the decision on
PACER. These decisions would not be locatable using traditional keyword
searching, because PACER does not offer that feature.85 PACER’s limitations
therefore render the missing decisions largely useless to all but the judges and court
staff that worked on a particular case and the parties that received the decision.
That kind of limited access is a problem that technology and the E-Government
Act were thought to have solved more than a decade ago. They didn’t.
But this is only two-thirds of the story. Merits terminations—which are the
focus of this Article—account for only approximately two-thirds of all
appellate-level dispositions in the federal courts. Approximately one-third of
all appeals are resolved through procedural dismissals.86 The vast majority of
procedural terminations are in a “black box.”87 Courts generally do not make
procedural terminations available as easily and freely as merits terminations.
That choice may make a good deal of sense for dismissals based on failure to
prosecute an appeal, but it makes less sense when the dismissal is for
jurisdictional reasons. We know far less about procedural terminations,
including how many result in published decisions. The First Circuit dataset
discussed in Part II suggests that we nevertheless have access to at least some
procedural terminations on commercial databases (approximately eleven
percent of the procedural terminations issued during the study period were
available).88 Some of these available procedural decisions are reasoned; others

83 See § 2241 (authorizing circuit judge to entertain an original application for a writ of habeas
corpus); § 2253(c) (requiring habeas corpus petitioner to seek certificate of appealability to appeal
adverse decision); § 2244(b)(3) (requiring courts of appeals to authorize second or successive habeas
corpus applications under § 2254 and § 2255).
84 See infra Section II.B.
85 See McCuskey, supra note 67, at 443 (“PACER, by contrast, is comprehensive but not yet
text-searchable, multi-jurisdictional, or indexed as finitely—so searching PACER for legal issues, as
opposed to case-identifying information, is lugubrious.”).
86 Compare 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-5 (merits terminations), with id.
tbl.B-5A (procedural terminations).
87 Kagan et al., supra note 17, at 688; see also David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage:
Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished Decisions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2005) (using
the same language to describe this “largely invisible and poorly understood” process).
88 See infra Table 7 (summarizing the First Circuit dataset).

1118

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1101

are, inexplicably, the kinds of procedural terminations that we might not expect
to find (for example, voluntary dismissals by the appellant or both parties).89
In their recent work, Kagan, Gill, and Marouf divvied up the world of
federal appellate output into four categories, based on relative usable access
to that output: (1) “[p]recedent decisions”; (2) “[n]onprecedent, visible
decisions”; (3) “[n]onprecedent, invisible decisions”; and (4) “[n]onmerits
decisions (invisible).”90 Although I agree with their focus on the relative
visibility of the courts’ work, I take issue with their use of “precedent” because
even unpublished decisions can be understood broadly as “precedent.” Even
though “unpublished” decisions are not binding, these decisions nevertheless
implicate the core reasons for why a “decisionmaking mechanism [might]
incorporate substantial precedential constraints”: concerns for judicial
decisionmaking fairness, efficiency, and predictability.91
I suggest, instead, that we focus on three tiers of federal appellate work:
(1) visible/accessible binding decisions; (2) visible/accessible nonbinding
decisions; and (3) invisible/inaccessible nonbinding decisions. “Decisions” is
a broad term that captures more formal opinions, as well as less formal
judgments and orders; “decisions” includes any “final order or opinion,” which
the Administrative Office reports as terminations.92 Some of these decisions
will be procedural and some will be on the merits. “Binding” refers to a
decision that (by virtue of the publication signal) will have a binding effect
on future cases and on lower courts. “Nonbinding” decisions, then, are
decisions that the appellate panel does not agree to follow in future cases;
these are decisions that affect only the parties themselves, though they may
be used by others persuasively. The visibility status describes decisions that
are available on court websites and in commercial databases.
This classification scheme redirects our attention to what are the defining
attributes of federal appellate decisions: their visibility/accessibility and their
binding/nonbinding effect. In resolving the appeals before them, the federal
courts appear to tailor their output along both of these dimensions. Not all
decisions will bind others, and not all decisions will be as easily accessible and
visible to the public as the decisions that do bind. My classification focuses
on the core features of the appellate courts’ decisional classification and
89 See, e.g., SimpliVity Corp. v. Bondranko, No. 16-2169, 2016 WL 9665544, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct.
6, 2016) (“Upon consideration of appellant’s unopposed motion, it is hereby ordered that this appeal
be voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).”).
90 Kagan et al., supra note 17, at 689; see also Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 87, at 1670 n.8 (using
similar taxonomy).
91 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-99 (1987) (discussing core values
of a precedential system); see also McCuskey, supra note 16, at 551-52 (arguing that district court
decisions should be broadly understood as precedent, even if not binding on others).
92 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
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issuance scheme: visibility and constraint.93 I am less focused on whether the
final decision is procedural (for example, a dismissal of an appeal for lack of
jurisdiction) or substantive (for example, an affirmance of a summary
judgment decision). Both types of decisions may have value, may be
accessible or inaccessible, and may constrain or not constrain.
The scheme as I describe it here also suggests that there may be a third
tier of appellate justice in the federal system. Richman and Reynolds’ powerful
work revealed a two-tier appellate justice system in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.94 They describe a first-tier process, whereby the system’s haves
receive careful judicial scrutiny, oral argument, and reasoned, published
decisions.95 The system’s have-nots, on the other hand, rarely receive oral
argument, their decisions are resolved by judicial staff attorneys with little
oversight, and their appeals end in short, perfunctory unpublished decisions.96
The unpublished decision itself is a signal of second-tier treatment.97 But the
original empirical work described in the next Part will reveal there is another
category, still: decisions thought so unimportant, uninteresting, or
unremarkable that courts resolve them without formal “opinions,” thereby
93 This classification scheme draws no distinction between procedural terminations and merits
terminations, as Kagan, Gill, and Marouf ’s does. The reason for failing to do so is two-fold: First,
and foremost, I will ultimately argue for free and total access to all federal appellate judge-ordered
terminations; because I want to mitigate the possibility of court screening based on decisional
issuance schemes, I don’t see much value in drawing a sharp distinction between procedural and
merits terminations in defining the right to our free access (though my reform proposal will draw a
distinction between judicial and clerk-ordered procedural terminations). Second, the types of orders
that resolve “merits” terminations and “procedural” terminations are not always that distinct; both
types of terminations can occur through perfunctory orders or judgments. It appears that the type
of order, as opposed to the type of termination, may play a more significant role in determining our
relative access to the termination. Because my classification scheme focuses on access, it seems less
useful to subdivide the categories further into procedural and merits terminations.
94 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20, at 116, 119-20 (describing appellate triage system).
95 See id. at 119-20. They provide an example of

a litigant in an ‘important’ antitrust or securities case, one who is represented by
serious counsel, [which] will get the full Learned Hand treatment. There will be oral
argument, an opinion prepared by the judge and her staff, and the result will contain
a sufficiently detailed explanation so that the whole world can second-guess the
result—and have an informed idea as to the state of the law.
Id.
96

Id. at 120. And they provide a counterexample:
A litigant who is poor, without counsel, and with a boring, repetitive problem, on the
other hand, can expect only the second-hand treatment that is available on Track Two.
Because Track Two provides so little information to the litigants or to the parties, no
one can even guess as to the quality of the justice handed out on that track.

Id.
97 See McAlister, supra note 43, at 567-68 (explaining the relationship between unpublished
decisions and the second-tier appellate justice system).
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locking a class of decisions away behind PACER’s paywall. The “third tier,”
then, are those decisions beneath unpublished visible decisions, which are the
mainstay of the second tier. The third tier is a body of appellate decisions that
are missing from the most widely used legal research tools.
II. WHAT’S MISSING FROM LEGAL DATABASES
This Part will explain how our navigable access to unpublished decisions
is not—and likely never has been—what we thought it was. It will detail the
extent of what’s missing throughout the circuits and offer some insight into
how those decisions escape the reach of commercial databases. It begins by
describing the process I used to compile the data that prove the existence of
submerged appellate precedent. Then it analyzes the data for two recent
Administrative Office reporting years (2017 and 2018); data for earlier years
appear in the Appendix. This Part will also consider a dataset of missing
decisions from the First Circuit to explain how decisions go missing and
evaluate the content of missing decisions.
A. The Data-Collection Process
To determine the extent of what’s missing, I compared publicly available
data from the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts with database hits
from each commercial database. This is not exactly an apples-to-apples
comparison, so let me explain first what the baseline Administrative Office
data include and then I’ll discuss the commercial database search process.
The Administrative Office reports on appellate terminations each year in
two categories: “merits” terminations and “procedural” terminations.98
Nearly all of the scholarly work on unpublished decisions focuses on “merits”
terminations from the U.S. Courts of Appeals.99 That’s because the only data
the Administrative Office makes publicly available on publication status
concerns “[o]pinion[s] or [o]rder[s]” in cases “[t]erminated on the
[m]erits,”100 as described in Table B-12 of the annual Judicial Business report.101
The data discussed here likewise derive from Table B-12.

98 Compare 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12 (merits terminations), with id.
tbl.B-5A (procedural terminations).
99 See, e.g., Kagan et al., supra note 17, at 696 (omitting procedural terminations from authors’ analysis).
100 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
101 Because the Administrative Office reports data on published and unpublished decisions on
a rolling twelve-month basis ending in September 30 of each year, the “year” for each data point
runs from October 1 to September 30. E.g., id.
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Although Table B-12 does not break down “merits” terminations by nature
of suit,102 it does provide some insight into whether “merits” terminations are
reasoned or not. The Administrative Office reports on “Signed” and
“Reasoned, Unsigned” final opinions/orders, and these categories “[i]include[]
only opinions and orders which expound the law as applied to the facts of the
case and detail the judicial reasons upon which the judgment is based.”103
Separately, the Administrative Office reports on “unsigned, without
comment” merits terminations, which appear to be unreasoned—meaning,
orders that do not “expound the law as applied to the facts of the case.”104
For the court-issued terminations baseline—that is, for the number of
annual appellate terminations each database should have—I used
postconsolidation105 “merits” terminations numbers from Table B-12 for each
circuit. These numbers included both published and unpublished
terminations. I also included in that baseline unreasoned or “without
comment” decisions. No commercial database reported omitting
terminations because they issued without reasoning.106
102 Other tables in Judicial Business do, however. Courts report “merits” terminations in eight
broad categories: “Criminal,” “U.S. Prisoner Petitions,” “Other U.S. Civil,” “Private Prisoner
Petitions,” “Other Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy,” “Administrative Agency Appeals,” and “Original
Proceedings and Miscellaneous Applications.” Id. tbl.B-5. Most of these categories are selfexplanatory, but some are not. “Private Prisoner Petitions” includes nonfederal prisoners (e.g., state
prisoners). Id. “Prisoner Petitions,” more generally, includes both habeas corpus and civil rights
filings from prisoners. Id. tbl.B1-A (identifying subcategories of cases within the eight major
categories). Neither prisoner category includes habeas corpus proceedings filed originally in the
appellate courts, requests to file second or successive habeas petitions, or requests for certificates of
appealability—all of which are within the “Original Proceedings and Miscellaneous Applications”
category (along with other requests to appeal). FED. R. APP. P. 22; 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3968, at 72, 75, § 3968.1, at 76, 83-84 (4th ed. 2008). These categories of appeals—
criminal, private prisoner, U.S. prisoner, and original proceedings, specifically—comprise
approximately sixty percent of all appellate proceedings terminated on the merits and
overwhelmingly involve pro se litigants, which are approximately half of all appellants in the federal
system. McAlister, supra note 43, at 555, 555 fig.6; 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-5.
103 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
104 Id.
105 A word about consolidation on appeal: A certain number of appeals are resolved or
terminated through consolidation; I used decisional numbers that accounted for and removed
consolidated decisions. Id. So, if three cases are consolidated into one, that would only count as one
merits termination. The Administrative Office tracks terminations through consolidation for appeals
resolved both on the merits and on procedural grounds. See id. (listing total terminations and
terminations through consolidation); id. tbl.B-5A (same).
106 See E-mail from Sue Moore, Academic Account Manager, Thomson Reuters, to Merritt E.
McAlister, Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of L. (Aug. 16, 2019, 10:16 AM) (relaying information from
Amanda Kenny, Product Developer, Thomson Reuters) (on file with author) (“In terms of what
Westlaw chooses to include in our content, we generally do not include ‘housekeeping’ orders.
Additionally, correcting orders are incorporated and merged into the original orders, rather than
published separately. Westlaw does not exercise any discretion in terms of the content of decisions
or orders.”). A representative at LexisNexis described their policy:

1122

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1101

I did not, however, include “procedural” terminations in my baseline.107 A
significant number of appeals as of right and original proceedings terminate on
procedural grounds. For the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2018,
for example, only approximately sixty-two percent of terminations were on the
merits, while one-third of terminations were on procedural grounds (the
remaining five percent of terminations were appeals resolved through
consolidation, which I excluded from all calculations).108 Procedural terminations
include dismissals for jurisdictional defects, voluntary dismissals under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 42, dismissals for defaults, and dismissals resulting
from procedural defects in the request for a certificate of appealability.109 Either
a judge (or two or three)110 may issue a procedural termination; other times, the
clerk’s office can dispose of the appeal on procedural grounds (in the case of
voluntary dismissals and some kinds of procedural defaults).111 Of the procedural
terminations during the 2018 reporting period, nearly twenty percent were
judicial procedural dismissals for jurisdictional reasons, while seventy-five
percent were dismissals from the clerk’s office (often for want of
prosecution/default or due to voluntary dismissal under Rule 42).112 The
following graph breaks down the relative percentage of procedural terminations
by judges and clerk’s offices during the 2018 reporting period.

The Lexis policy at the appellate level, both federal and state, is to collect all substantive,
written opinions. Depending on the jurisdiction, our collection guidelines may limit the
collection of purely procedure orders, e.g., a routine scheduling order. However, the
length of the document does not determine its substantive value, as a one-word
affirmance would be highly valuable as part of the overall case history in Shepard’s.
E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note 32.
107 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-5A.
108 Compare id. tbl.B-5 (merits terminations), with id. tbl.B-5A (procedural terminations). See
also supra note 105 (discussing consolidation).
109 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-5A. A decision to grant or deny a certificate
of appealability on the merits of the request is a “merits” termination. See id. tbl.B-5.
110 Some procedural terminations result from one-judge orders; others from two-judge orders;
and still others receive a full panel. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. R. 27-1(d)(2) (single judge may rule on
certificates of appealability); id. 27-1(e) (authorizing two-judge panels for specified motions); 3D
CIR. R. 27.5 (describing powers of single judge).
111 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 42(b); 11TH CIR. R. 42(a), (b) (“The circuit clerk may dismiss a
docketed appeal if the parties file a signed dismissal agreement . . . .”); 3D CIR. R. 24.2 (discussing
dismissals for failure to file).
112 2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-5A.
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Figure 1: Procedural Terminations in 2018 by Type of Resolution
Procedrual
Terms. Through
Consolidation,
1%

Judicial
Prodedural
Judicial Terms. (All
Prodedural Other)
Terms.
6%

(Jurisdictional
Defects), 19%

Clerk Terms.
(Other), 7%

Clerk Terms.
(Defaults), 37%

Clerk Terms.
(FRAP 42), 30%

The bottom line: the majority of procedural dismissals involve
administrative, and not judicial, action. To that end, many procedural
terminations likely issue without much or any reasoning, and therefore we
might not expect that these decisions would find their way to a commercial
database. But that is not true of all procedural terminations, of course. Some
terminations for jurisdictional reasons by the court will have public value—
possibly significant public value. Indeed, some procedural terminations result
in precedential, published decisions.113 Dismissals by the clerk’s office, on the
other hand, generally are only descriptive, as clerk’s office terminations only
occur by agreement of the parties114 or after the appellant fails to prosecute
the appeal (assuming notice of such dismissal has been given).115
Because the commercial databases generally do not catalogue
“housekeeping” orders,116 and because few of those orders are findable
without using the fee-based PACER system, I therefore did not include
procedural termination numbers in my baseline comparisons. Even if these
decisions have public value, the commercial databases generally do not pick
them up (and the First Circuit dataset suggests that databases pick up only
about ten percent of procedural terminations).117 What is reasonable to
expect, and what the commercial databases indicate we should expect, is that
all postconsolidation “merits terminations” are available on Westlaw, Lexis,

113 See, e.g., Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.”); Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Lacking jurisdiction, we
dismiss the appeal.”).
114 FED. R. APP. P. 42(b).
115 See, e.g., 11TH CIR. R. 42-1(b) (describing failure-to-prosecute procedures).
116 See supra note 106 (discussing content decisions of commercial databases).
117 See infra subsection II.C.2 (discussing decisions in First Circuit dataset).
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and Bloomberg Law. That is why I used postconsolidation merits termination
numbers as a baseline for the comparisons discussed below.
Before I describe how I obtained the commercial database data, I should
note that there is reason for some concern over the reliability of
Administrative Office data.118 But researchers have suggested that data are
likely to be “highly reliable” where a variable “is useful to track court
workload or assign resources.”119 The data I rely on here generally fall into
those more reliable categories, though transcription errors in that data are
possible.120 I am doubtful, however, that transcription errors alone account
for the disparities discussed in the next part (and confirmed by the close
examination of missing decisions from the First Circuit).121
Now, I turn to the commercial database data. To obtain the database
comparators, I ran searches in Westlaw, Lexis, and BloombergLaw’s opinions
or cases databases limited to the particular circuit (excluding district court
cases) for the same corresponding time period as each Administrative Office
table. For Westlaw, I searched the “Circuit Court of Appeals Cases” database
for each geographic circuit using the following advanced search term to obtain
data corresponding with the twelve-month period ending on September 30,
2017: DA(aft 09-30-2016 & bef 10-01-2017). I changed the advanced search
term to “09-30-2015” and “10-01-2016,” for the previous twelve-month period
and the years that followed until the twelve-month period beginning on 1001-2007. I then recorded the number of hits obtained for that period without
any additional filtering on the search results.
118

According to one author,
Legal scholars have long been suspicious of the accuracy of the [Administrative Office]
data. [Administrative Office] bankruptcy data in particular have been judged ‘error
ridden’ and ‘utterly inadequate for policy purposes.’ Legal scholars working in other
fields have defended the [Administrative Office] data as at least serviceable depending
on the research question and the subtlety of the statistical techniques used.

Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1581, 1652 (2006); see also Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The
Six-Month List and the Unintended Consequences of Judicial Accountability, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 363,
419 n.127 (2020) (discussing unreliability of Administrative Office “outcome” data).
119 Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2003).
120 See Jennifer Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of Bankruptcy Statistics,
101 COM. L.J. 307, 340-41 (1996) (identifying “carelessness” and transcription errors in Administrative
Office data for bankruptcy court statistics and concluding that although “bankruptcy clerk transcription
errors do not significantly lower accuracy rates,” “local data entry practices” do exacerbate error rate in
“nature of case” data). But see Adam M. Samaha, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Inputs and Outputs
on Appeal: An Empirical Study of Briefs, Big Law, and Case Complexity, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
519, 529-30 (2020) (observing that authors’ “[o]wn experience with [Administrative Office] appellate
data has been positive in the main” and that results of audits “were encouraging”).
121 See infra Section II.C (discussing First Circuit merits decisions found on PACER but
unavailable on Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg Law).
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For Lexis, I requested all content for its circuit-specific “cases” database
and then I limited those results using the “timeline” feature in Lexis Advance.
I used a timeline of 10/1/20** to 09/30/20**, depending on the twelve-month
period at issue. I then recorded the number of hits obtained during that
twelve-month period without any additional filtering on the search results.
The process for retrieving database hits from Bloomberg Law was similar,
with one important difference. Bloomberg Law’s opinions database has a 1,000hit limit.122 Accordingly, for most circuits, I had to break the date-limited search
into several months or even one-month time periods (for the Ninth Circuit, in
particular) to ensure completeness. Otherwise, the process was functionally the
same: I conducted a search (without any keywords) limited only by a date range
(10/1/20** to 09/30/20**) for a particular twelve-month period. I then recorded
the number of hits that each date-limited search returned.
To gather coverage data for the FDsys database, I conducted an
“advanced” date-range search for between 10/1/20** and 09/30/20** in the
United States Courts Opinions database for each consecutive twelve-month
period. Although I limited that search by circuit, it was necessary to filter by
circuit as well, because the database returns hits for both district court and
circuit decisions within each circuit search. I recorded the number of hits
returned for each appropriately limited search, which was sometimes “0”
when the database did not have any data for a particular circuit during a
particular twelve-month period.
Finally, a word of caution on reproducing my results: The databases are
not static. As Westlaw and Lexis both stated, material may be added to a
database at any time.123 Unsurprisingly, then, rerunning these searches at a
later point in time revealed slight discrepancies. On occasion, one or two hits
fewer or more would occur over the relevant time period. The data described
here are accurate as of September/October 2019, when I asked a research
assistant to update the initial results I obtained in June 2019.
122 Missing decisions may be findable if armed with certain case information by doing a docketbased search on Bloomberg Law. Bloomberg Law operates two databases for federal appellate court
material: an “opinion database” and a “docket database.” E-mail from Tiffany Lozano, supra note 32.
The former is similar to Westlaw and Lexis’s “cases” databases. The latter is essentially a more usable
form of the federal courts’ public electronic records system, known as PACER, and “consists of [a]
daily collection of newly filed unsealed cases.” Id. Although Bloomberg Law’s docket search system
is keyword searchable (unlike PACER), its functionality is limited in so far as researchers generally
may not isolate particular types of docket entries (including orders or opinions) for any circuit court,
id., resulting in a significant volume of irrelevant search hits. Moreover, the Bloomberg Law docket
database frequently requires manual updating—even when decisions were issued several years
earlier. For these reasons, Bloomberg Law’s opinions database may be the tool of choice for many
researchers, which is why I discuss it (and not the dockets database) here.
123 E-mail from Sue Moore, supra note 106 (relaying information from Amanda Kenny, Product
Developer, Thomson Reuters) (describing access to unpublished decisions as “an evolving pool”); E-mail
from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note 32 (“If we do miss a case, we are always happy to add it to our database.”).
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B. The Extent of What’s Missing
Let’s start with the raw numbers. In the twelve-month period ending
September 30, 2017, the twelve geographic courts of appeals self-reported that
they issued 34,045 merits decisions.124 For the same time period, a search of
Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law’s circuit-specific opinions databases
returned 24,446, 24,826, and 24,716 total hits, respectively; FDsys returned only
17,297 hits.125 Buried within that discrepancy are a few notable facts. First, the
discrepancy among the commercial databases is, overall, slight. Second, the size
of the discrepancy varies by circuit. Table 1, below, includes the raw numbers.
Table 1: Availability of Merits Terminations 126

D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.
Total

2017 AO
2017
2017
2017
2017
Reported Available Available Available Available
Merits
FDsys Bloomberg Westlaw
Lexis
481
583
906
526
917
904
491
485
507
493
2355
253
1562
1657
1570
2146
1444
1523
1610
1525
3397
3360
3256
3303
3260
4608
3228
3488
3603
3499
3616
1090
1938
1853
1957
1699
1064
1241
1230
1258
2472
1216
1814
1304
1824
7456
727
5074
5219
5093
1297
1910
1182
1207
1182
3614
1931
2247
2427
2248
34045
17297
24716
24446
24826

Let me underscore a few points about the limits of these comparisons—
limitations that follow from the discussion of the data-collection process
above.127 Although the Administrative Office numbers in Table 1 capture
124 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-12. Because the Administrative Office does
not report data on unpublished decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
that circuit’s work is not discussed in this Article.
125 See supra Section II.A. (describing data collection procedures).
126 Data from the “AO” is the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and is available
Caseload Statistics Data Tables, supra note 8. Data from Bloomberg Law, Westlaw, and Lexis describe
the number of database hits returned on the searches described above. See supra Section II.A.
(describing data collection procedures).
127 See supra notes 107–112 and accompanying text (discussing the decision to exclude
procedural terminations in comparison).
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“merits” or nonprocedural final orders and opinions,128 the data for the
databases capture any individual database entry or hit. Some database hits are
duplicate entries.129 Some are procedural orders that I excluded from my
baseline Administrative Office comparison data.130 For these reasons, the
number of database “hits” I retrieved likely includes a nontrivial number of
nonmerits decisions or duplicate entries. That means that even the number
of available database hits for each circuit represents an overly optimistic proxy
for coverage; not every hit returned in a time-limited search will be a “merits”
termination within the meaning of the Administrative Office’s data. More is
missing than even these numbers convey.
Consider the data from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It is
the only court for which each database search returned more hits than the
number of merits terminations the court reported it issued during the same
twelve-month period. That’s actually the trend we might expect from courts that
make more decisions—especially more procedural decisions and more nonfinal
decisions—available to the databases. Because the databases generally do not
screen for content,131 courts that make available both procedural terminations
and nonfinal orders on free, public-access websites will have greater coverage in
commercial databases. In those circumstances, a commercial database that
retrieves and archives all content available for free from a court website would
return more database hits than the number of merits terminations reported by
the Administrative Office in any particular twelve-month period.132
For these reasons, I describe my results in terms of the “maximum
possible” coverage for each database. That term recognizes that the database
hits represent only the maximum possible coverage, if we assume that every
hit is, in fact, a merits termination as the Administrative Office defines it.
Because, in reality, not every hit will be a merits termination within the
meaning of the Administrative Office data, “maximum possible” should be
understood to capture uncertainty as to the actual content of each database—
an inquiry that is beyond the scope of this Article.
Figure 2 shows the maximum possible coverage of each database across all
circuits for the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2017. Although
See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text (discussing Table B-12 data).
The First Circuit search returned approximately twenty duplicates in data for Lexis and
Bloomberg Law during a single twelve-month period; Westlaw had fewer duplicates.
130 Approximately eleven percent of the commercial database hits in my First Circuit dataset
sample were procedural orders.
131 See supra note 106 (discussing the fact that commercial databases generally do not screen for
content in federal appellate decision databases, except for purely “housekeeping” orders).
132 The D.C. Circuit, for example, makes available all “judgments” free of charge on its website, which
includes both procedural and merits terminations based on the First Circuit dataset. See Judgments Archive,
U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIR., https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/judgments.nsf
[https://perma.cc/L84L-3TX5]; see also infra subsection II.C.2 (discussing First Circuit data on judgments).
128
129
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these percentages are likely overly optimistic for the reasons just discussed,
they are the best we can say about coverage. At most, only approximately
seventy percent of court-reported merits terminations from 2017 are available
on commercial databases across all circuits; only about fifty percent are
available on the public-access database, FDsys.
Figure 2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations for
Each Database in 2017

FDsys
Bloomberg
Westlaw
Lexis
0%
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20%
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Circuit-specific data identify expected variations in coverage across the
circuits.133 Figure 3 demonstrates that only one circuit—the D.C. Circuit—
has decisional coverage on par with what we might expect: more database hits
than the number of merits terminations reported to the Administrative Office
for that year. Coverage for every other circuit in the commercial legal
databases is worse than the number of merits terminations issued. The Fourth
Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have better coverage than their peer circuits in
every database. The First Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit
have the worst; barely more than fifty percent of the merits terminations in
these circuits are available in user-friendly databases.

133 See generally Levy, supra note 52 (discussing circuit-level variation and uniformity in case
management).
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Figure 3: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in 2017
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Data from the most recent reporting year reflect better coverage. In the
twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2018, the geographic circuits
reported issuing 31,408 merits decisions.134 Database hits in Bloomberg Law
and Lexis exceeded that number, suggesting a substantial improvement in
coverage.135 Coverage in FDsys remained startlingly low, however: only
13,326 hits, which reflects less coverage than FDsys had for the year before.
Westlaw had far less coverage than its competitors: a Westlaw search returned
only 24,425 hits for the same time period. Table 2 details the numbers by
circuit, while Figure 4 reveals the maximum possible coverage for merits
terminations across each database. Note that the percentage is greater than
one-hundred percent for both Lexis and Bloomberg Law, because the
databases contain more hits than reported merits decisions, likely indicating
coverage of additional nonmerits or nonfinal decisions.

2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
Bloomberg Law and Lexis data are surprisingly consistent. Lexis frequently provides access
to court records for third parties. See, e.g., Myrick v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 15-00562, 2017
WL 4798154, at *2 (Oct. 24, 2017) (describing LexisNexis as “public records vendor” for a consumer
credit reporting agency).
134
135
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Table 2: Coverage Across Platforms and Circuits

D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.
Total

2018 AO
2018
2018
2018
2018
Reported Available Available Available Available
Merits
FDsys Bloomberg Westlaw
Lexis
553
589
977
617
980
760
381
333
388
334
2266
0
1562
1744
1561
1778
1164
1208
1350
1207
3049
3124
2879
3011
2882
4152
1576
3045
3220
3047
3121
1038
3860
2031
3957
1412
1047
1218
1177
1223
2243
1178
1851
1334
1854
7386
412
11014
5867
11546
1212
1822
1129
1145
1109
3476
995
3744
2541
3828
31408
13326
32820
24425
33528

Figure 4: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations
for Each Database in 2017
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The aggregate court-wide data obscure the persistence of inter-circuit
discrepancies in coverage. Figure 5 reveals that improvements in coverage for
several of the busiest courts (the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the
Eleventh Circuit) accounted for improved aggregate coverage in 2018. Other
circuits—including the First Circuit—continued to have low coverage.
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Figure 5: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in 2018
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The developments in 2018 suggest that not all databases are created equal;
Westlaw’s coverage is lower than its competitors, a finding consistent with prior
work on coverage issues.136 And FDsys continues to have anemic coverage for
almost every circuit. Not all circuits are created equal, either. Discrepancies
vary widely by circuit. Some courts make far more of their output available for
use in commercial databases; others significantly under-provide decisions to
commercial databases. And nearly all circuits cheat FDsys—the only aggregate,
free, and government-run database—of federal appellate decisions. The cause
of these disparities is beyond the scope of the work I undertake here. But some
of the discussion in Section II.C may shed light on the source of these
disparities—namely, what the courts make available for free on their websites.
Appendix A contains similar figures dating back to the twelve-month
period ending on September 30, 2008. It contains two charts for every year.
The first figure displays database-wide maximum possible coverage for all
federal appellate merits terminations during each twelve-month period (like
Figures 2 and 4 here), and the second shows the per-circuit maximum possible
coverage for each twelve-month period (like Figures 3 and 5 here). The story
is largely the same: year over year, coverage for some circuits is lower than we
might expect, while coverage for others is more robust. The D.C. Circuit has

136 Kagan et al., supra note 17, at 696-99 (demonstrating disparity in access to immigration
appeals between Lexis and Westlaw).
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the greatest coverage, by far; the Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit are the
next best; the First Circuit and the Sixth Circuit are, overall, the worst.
The historical data reveal an additional anomaly: coverage was generally better
a decade ago than it has been in recent times—at least in 2016 and 2017. For the
twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2008, for example, maximum
possible coverage of merits terminations was at or near ninety percent across the
three commercial databases.137 (It was still less than fifty percent in the FDsys.138)
Although those aggregate numbers are driven, at least in part, by significant
overages for the D.C. Circuit, eight of the remaining eleven geographic circuits
had greater than eighty percent coverage that year.139 Contrast that with the
coverage less than a decade later: in the twelve-month period ending on
September 30, 2017, coverage dropped below eighty percent in all but three circuits
(the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit).140
C. Observations About Missing Decisions
By now, I have established that significant coverage gaps exist for most
circuits across the last decade. What we don’t know—and what is much harder
to determine—is what content is missing from the databases. We can glean
some insights from a closer examination of the First Circuit’s coverage, but,
before discussing those results, this section will make a few initial observations
about what categories of appeals may or may not be missing from the databases.
1. The Likely Suspects
Many of us likely assume that what’s missing has little, if any, content,
and, relatedly, has little value. Kagan, Gill, and Marouf already have
disproved that assumption by showing that significant gaps in substantive
immigration appellate decisions exist.141 One might assume that my data only
confirm theirs. But the discrepancies are substantial enough that known gaps
in immigration appeals coverage cannot account for the results.
Although Administrative Office statistics are not sufficiently granular to
determine the volume of immigration appeals resolved during any twelvemonth period, we know that in the twelve-month period ending on
September 30, 2017, for example, the courts of appeals only resolved 2,661
administrative appeals on the merits.142 Administrative appeals include, but
Appendix A, Figure 9.1.
Appendix A, Figure 9.1.
Appendix A, Figure 9.2.
Supra Figure 2.
Kagan et al., supra note 17, at 698-99 (describing gaps in immigration coverage between
2009 and 2012).
142 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-5.
137
138
139
140
141
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are not limited to, immigration appeals. So, known gaps in immigration
appeals cannot possibly account for the 10,000-decision shortfall in 2017 (see
Table 1). Further, there’s no reason to believe that 2017 was an outlier, given
the relatively persistent pattern of discrepancies.
Other presumptively valueless missing decisions remain: one-word orders
affirming the decision below without reasoning and similarly perfunctory
orders in original proceedings and miscellaneous applications. Although both
kinds of decisions may have value as part of the procedural or decisional history
of a case, these cases may have less value as reasoned or useful precedent.
None of these categories of unreasoned decisions can, on their own, make
up the shortfalls in the data (though they could account for the totality of
what’s missing in any particular circuit). The courts of appeals self-report that
they issue relatively few purely unreasoned or “without comment” merits
decisions. Indeed, in 2018 the courts collectively, issued only 1,373
“[u]nsigned, [w]ithout [c]omment” decisions.143 Moreover, the vast majority
of those—or 1,192 of the 1,373—came from one circuit: the Eighth Circuit.144
The year before, when the shortfall was much greater, the courts still only
issued 2,803 unreasoned or “[u]nsigned, [w]ithout [c]omment” decisions.145
That relatively small volume of decisions—only 8.2% of all merits decisions—
cannot account for the gaps in coverage (either on its own or in combination
with the known gaps for immigration appeals).
What that also means is that a significant percentage of the missing
decisions are decisions that, at least according to the Administrative Office,
“expound the law as applied to the facts of the case and detail the judicial
reasons upon which the judgment is based.”146 That’s assuming that courts
accurately disclose the percentage of decisions that meet the Administrative
Office’s
reasoned-elaboration
threshold—a
potentially
dubious
147
proposition. What we can say here is that, at least according to the courts
themselves, most of their output does meet some minimal reason-giving
threshold; the courts, therefore, have no cause to withhold decisions from free
and publicly accessible court websites for content reasons (or at least not at
the levels seen in the data).
One caveat: some circuits have relied more heavily on “without comment”
decisions at earlier points in time. Table 3, below, shows the percentage of
“without comment” decisions as a fraction of all merits decisions issued by
each circuit between 2008 and 2017. Notably, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily
2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12.
Id.
2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-12.
Id. n.1.
See McAlister, supra note 43, at 576-82 (discussing poor decisional quality of opinions
classified as reasoned by appellate courts).
143
144
145
146
147
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on this practice between 2012 and 2015, which could account for coverage gaps
in that circuit during that time period. But coverage problems persist for the
Ninth Circuit, despite issuing more reasoned decisions in later years; in 2017,
coverage in commercial databases was near seventy percent, and less than
sixteen percent of the court’s merits decisions were unreasoned.
Table 3: Percentage of Unreasoned Merits Terminations148
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

D.C. Cir.

0.2%

0.0%

0.0%

1st Cir.

0.1%

0.2%

0.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.2%

0.0%

0.0%

0.2%

0.4%

1.1%

1.4%

1.3%

1.2%

2.4%
0.0%

2d Cir.

0.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

3d Cir.

2.4%

4.9%

5.7%

5.2%

4.6%

4.6%

5.2%

5.4%

5.5%

3.1%

4th Cir.

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

5th Cir.

0.6%

0.6%

0.3%

0.5%

0.6%

0.5%

0.5%

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

6th Cir.

1.2%

0.1%

0.1%

0.3%

0.2%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

7th Cir.

3.5%

2.1%

2.0%

1.4%

1.5%

0.4%

0.6%

0.1%

0.0%

0.3%

8th Cir.

31.2%

38.0%

33.5%

37.0%

48.6

52.0%

51.6%

52.9%

54.7%

57.5%

9th Cir.

0.1%

0.3%

8.1%

19.6%

46.6%

45.5%

45.8%

40.4%

19.0%

15.7%

10th Cir.

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

11th Cir.

6.4%

5.8%

6.6%

6.1%

2.6%

3.1%

3.3%

3.0%

1.9%

1.9%

Finally, standing on their own, decisions in “original proceedings” also
cannot account for the shortfalls across all circuits. The Administrative Office
data on unpublished decisions include merits terminations for this category
of appellate proceedings; for the twelve-month period ending on September
30, 2017, for example, the courts resolved approximately 6,000 “original
proceedings” on the “merits.”149 That sizable number still cannot account for
all missing termination decisions during the same time period (approximately
10,000). It’s possible that this category of merits terminations, combined with
immigration appeals and “without comment” decisions, are the sum total of
what’s missing. But these are sometimes overlapping—and not necessarily
mutually exclusive—categories, as some unreasoned decisions likely include
immigration appeals and certainly include “original proceedings.” Data from
the First Circuit example, moreover, suggest that the story is more
complicated than missing only “original proceedings.” Although many merits
148 Data reported here derive from comparing the number of “without comment” decisions
(whether published or not) against the total number of postconsolidation merits decisions issued in
each circuit every year, as reported in Table B-12 of the Administrative Office’s annual Judicial
Business publication. See, e.g., 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-5.
149 Id.
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terminations in original proceedings likely are missing from commercial
databases, not all are, and nationally more decisions are missing than this
category of appellate proceedings alone contains.
The bottom line: at least a nontrivial portion of what is missing from
commercial databases are the very decisions we expect the commercial
databases to have: reasoned, unpublished decisions resolving appeals as of
right from district courts and administrative agencies. The First Circuit
example discussed in the next section confirms this insight.
2. The First Circuit Example
Because the volume of what’s missing is so significant, it is beyond the
scope of this work to offer a comprehensive account of how the decisions have
gone missing, what they look like, and what value they may have. But I can
begin to answer those important questions by examining the missing decisions
in one circuit: the First Circuit. The First Circuit is a particularly good
example of the missing decisions phenomenon because the court has both
persistent gaps in coverage and a relatively low volume of appellate activity,
making it a manageable circuit to examine. In other ways, however, I should
note that the First Circuit is an outlier. It has one of the highest publication
rates across the circuits (second only to the D.C. Circuit in 2017 and 2018).150
Despite that low unpublication rate, the First Circuit has one of the most
significant gaps in database coverage for unpublished decisions. In Table 4,
below, I compare the number of unpublished merits terminations the First
Circuit has reported each year to the number of unpublished decisions
available for the same corresponding time on Westlaw and Lexis.151 Put in
terms of relative percentage of maximum possible coverage for unpublished
merits terminations, coverage ranges from thirty percent to barely more than
six percent over the last decade, as Table 5 demonstrates.

2018 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 21, tbl.B-12; 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-12.
Bloomberg Law and FDsys do not permit filtering by publication status, so these charts do
not include that data.
150
151
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Table 4: Number of Unpublished First Circuit Decisions Available on
Commercial Databases

2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008

AO
474
553
604
551
545
601
611
510
627
647
592

Westlaw
116
169
55
52
38
54
47
39
39
74
82

Lexis
62
157
56
56
44
68
63
51
50
97
97

Table 5: Percentage of Unpublished First Circuit Decisions Available on
Commercial Databases

2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008

Westlaw
24.5%
30.6%
9.1%
9.4%
7.0%
9.0%
7.7%
7.6%
6.2%
11.4%
13.9%

Lexis
13.1%
28.4%
9.3%
10.2%
8.1%
11.3%
10.3%
10.0%
8.0%
15.0%
16.4%

How does this happen? The First Circuit triages its appellate decisions,
explaining that due to the “volume of filings” it “cannot dispose of each case
by opinion.”152 “Opinion,” its Local Rules suggest, is a term of art—perhaps
used to be consistent with the E-Government Act of 2002.153 The First
Circuit issues three types of decisions in appeals: “order, memorandum and

152 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(a).
153 See Pub. L. No. 107-347,

§ 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note).
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order, or opinion.”154 “[S]ome opinions are rendered in unpublished form;
that is, the opinions are directed to the parties but are not published in West’s
Federal Reporter.”155 Although it is the court’s policy to “prefer” that
“opinions . . . be published,” sometimes they are issued in unpublished
form.156 Ultimately, these unpublished “opinions” are what the commercial
databases find, because “opinions”—whether published or not—are the
decisions that the court posts to its website and makes freely available to the
public. All types of “unpublished” adjudications in the First Circuit—
including opinions, memoranda, and orders—may be cited for their
persuasive value.157 But only “opinions” are easy and free to find.
The First Circuit’s website also exposes the problem—if you look
carefully. Its “opinion search” feature contains only a fraction of the merits
decisions the court issues each year—that is, only the cases that it has formally
resolved with an “opinion.”158 The rest of its adjudications—those resolved
with orders or memoranda—are hidden behind a PACER paywall under the
label “judgments.” Some of these judgements are extensive, with several
pages of reasoned explanation.159 Others are perfunctory.160

154 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(a).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 32.1.0(a) (“An

unpublished judicial opinion, order, judgment or other written
disposition of this court may be cited regardless of the date of issuance. The court will consider such
dispositions for their persuasive value but not as binding precedent.”).
158 U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Opinions, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST CIR., http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/opinions/ (enter desired search parameters).
159 See, e.g., Bogosian v. Hall, No. 15–1681 (1st Cir. Jan. 4, 2017); Stalcup v. Naval Special
Warfare Command, No. 15–2107 (1st Cir. Feb. 8, 2017); United States v. Suarez-Rodriguez, No. 152511 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2017).
160 See, e.g., Sloan v. Hearst Media Co., No. 16–1885, slip op. at 1 (1st Cir. Oct. 28, 2016) (“After
careful de novo review of the record and the parties’ submissions, we affirm the dismissal of the
complaint, substantially for the reasons adopted by the district court.”); In re Lewis, Nos. 16–1054
& 16–1398, slip op. at 1 (1st Cir. Nov. 14, 2016) (similar); Reedom v. Colvin, No. 16–1531, slip op. at
1 (1st Cir. May 8, 2017) (similar).
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First, let’s find these judgments. “Judgments” are available only by
logging into the PACER system on the First Circuit’s website. When you do,
this screen appears:
Figure 6

At the top of the screen, it is easy to spot the distinction the First Circuit
draws: “opinions” are separated from “orders/judgments.” Clicking on the
“orders/judgments” link takes you to this screen:
Figure 7

From here, you can isolate orders, judgments, opinions, dispositive entries
only, and per curiam (or unsigned) entries only. Not every dispositive entry
has an “opinion,” and only opinions are available through the main circuit
webpage. Neither the “opinion” search feature, nor the judgment search
feature are keyword searchable, but both may be searched using a date
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limitation (or by case number). Note that the judgments search page makes
clear that each search will incur PACER fees—fees that may exceed the “30
page limit on PACER charges.” Each search, therefore, may cost more than
$3.00 (at 10 cents per page) if the search returns more than 30 pages.161
Further, retrieval of each judgment incurs an additional 10 cent per-page fee,
as the Download Confirmation screen here warns me before asking whether
to proceed to recover this particular judgment:
Figure 8

After reviewing the website, I hypothesized that “judgments” without
“opinions” were largely what was missing from the First Circuit data on
Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law. Because the databases each report that
they depend on court websites and other public-source material for their data,
if judgments issued without separate opinions are hidden behind paywalls,
then they may be retrieved infrequently (if at all).
To test this hypothesis, a research assistant and I ran searches for twelve
months’ worth of judgments corresponding with the Administrative Office
reporting year ending on September 30, 2017. We exported each month’s
worth of data into an Excel spreadsheet. Because these judgments often have
significant docket text, as the next screen shot demonstrates, we were able to
code the decisions from the docket sheet alone as “merits,” “procedural,” or

161 I incurred approximately $81.60 in PACER fees to retrieve the First Circuit dataset and
related data used in this Article. See E-mail from Do_Not_Reply@psc.uscourts.gov to author (Oct.
12, 2019 4:17 AM) (on file with author) (indicating a quarterly balance due of $81.60). Once I
obtained a complete list of judgments during the relevant time period from PACER, I used
Bloomberg Law’s docket-based search to retrieve each individual missing decision; I almost always
had to “update” the docket on Bloomberg Law and/or request the judgment (a feature that is free to
users, like me, with an academic account).
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“disciplinary” and identify the outcome of the proceeding (“affirmed,”
“vacated,” “reversed,” “granted,” “denied,” “dismissed,” etc.).
Figure 9

Our twelve-month collection of judgments compares favorably with the data
the First Circuit reported to the Administrative Office for the same period.
Table 6 compares the data we collected through the judgment search to the
Administrative Office statistics. The third column indicates the rate of capture.
The bottom line: a “judgments” search captures all decisional output from the
First Circuit, whether procedural terminations or merits terminations.
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Table 6: Terminations Recovered through First Circuit PACER Judgment Search162

Cases/Proceedings
Terminated on the
Merits
Cases/Proceedings
Terminated on
Procedural Grounds

Administrative
Office Data
904

Collected Data
871

Percentage
Recovered
96.3%

507

506

99.8%

But not all “judgments” are available for free on the court website. Only
361 or 39.9% of the judgments we coded as “merits” terminations had a
corresponding “opinion” available on the First Circuit website. One hundred
percent of those 361 judgments with a corresponding opinion on the court’s
public website were also available on Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law.
Overall, however, only 406 or 44.9% of the judgments we coded as merits
decisions were available on each of the three commercial databases. The
databases only captured forty-five additional merits terminations—that is,
forty-five additional merits decisions that did not appear on the court
website—during the relevant twelve-month period.
Coverage for procedural decisions was, as expected, much worse. Less than
four percent of reported procedural terminations appeared on the court
website as opinions (all of which also appeared in the commercial databases).
About forty-one additional procedural terminations were findable on the
commercial databases—roughly the same number of additional findable merits
terminations (forty-five, as discussed above). Table 7 breaks down the data.
Table 7: Availability of First Circuit Merits and Procedural Terminations in
Databases and on Court Website

Merits
Terminations
Procedural
Terminations

Issued per
Administrative
Office

Available on
Commercial
Databases

Available on
Court Website

904

406 (44.9%)

361 (39.9%)

507

58 (11.4%)

17 (3.4%)

162 The Administrative Office statistics can be found on Tables B-5 (merits) and B-5A
(procedural). 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-5A (2017); id. tbl.B-5.
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Recall that “merits terminations” and “procedural terminations” within the
meaning of the Administrative Office statistics include more than decisions in
traditional appeals as of right; the Administrative Office also includes decisions
in original proceedings and miscellaneous applications within these termination
numbers. We isolated appeals as of right from original proceedings in our dataset
based on the type of outcome (affirmed/vacated/remanded/reversed versus
granted/denied). Of the 871 merits judgments collected (see Table 6), 625 (or 72%)
involved appeals resulting in an affirmance, vacatur, reversal, or enforcement of
a district court decision or administrative order.
Two hundred eighty-four of the 625 merits terminations in appeals as of
right in the dataset never made it to the First Circuit’s website; the clear
majority of those 284 decisions—253 of the 284 or 89%—were also missing
from each of the commercial databases. Eleven decisions could be found on
one or more databases but were not available on all three. Table 8 examines
the coverage for appeals as of right from a district court or administrative
agency resolved on the merits. Only slightly more than half of those appeals
resulted in decisions posted on the court website, and slightly less than sixty
percent of merits appeals were findable using commercial databases.
Table 8: Availability of First Circuit Merits Terminations in Appeals as of Right

Merits
Terminations
in Appeals as
of Right

Available in
Dataset

Available on
Court
Website

Missing
from Court
Website

625 (72% of
all merits
terminations
retrieved)

341 (54.6%
of all merits
terminations
in appeals as
of right)

284 (45.4%
of all merits
terminations
in appeals as
of right)

Missing
from All
Three
Databases
253 (40.5%
of all merits
terminations
in appeals as
of right)

To understand the impact of what’s missing, we pulled copies of every
judgment missing from all three commercial databases off of Bloomberg
Law’s dockets database (which is equivalent to PACER but more userfriendly and free for academics).163 Of the missing decisions, the majority—
but not all—affirmed the judgment below. Some—like the result discussed in
Mr. Jones’s case in the introduction164—involved favorable results for the
appellant. The missing decisions dataset contained no outright reversals,

163
164

See supra note 122 (describing Bloomberg Law’s available databases).
See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones case).
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however. Table 9 indicates the outcome in the missing decisions. As might be
expected, approximately ninety percent were affirmances.
Table 9

Number of
Affirmances/Enforcement
228
90.1%

Number of
Vacaturs
13
5.1%

Number of
Remands
12
4.7%

Number of
Reversals
0
0.0%

The missing decisions are largely reasoned—meaning that they usually cite
to legal authority to support the result and almost always give some explanation
for the result. That is to say, there are no one-word affirmances among the
missing decisions dataset.165 Table 10 shows the mean and median word count
for the missing decisions, as well as the range in length of the missing decisions;
some say quite a lot and some, as we might expect, say little. Table 11
demonstrates that the majority of the decisions cite to at least some case law
authority to support the result, but 51 of the 253 decisions (or approximately
20%) do not cite to any case law. There were also twenty-eight decisions in which
the court noted that criminal defense counsel had filed a brief under Anders v.
California.166 Excluding the Anders appeals and those decisions that cite no law,
at least seventy percent of the missing decisions arguably have some value as
precedent insofar as they explain and apply the law to a set of identified (and
potentially unique) facts. The rest may still have some value as an indication that
the appellate court approved the result below or found no error on appeal.

165 Not all of the decisions provide satisfying reasons, however; decisions that do no more than
affirm for the reasons given by the district court may be inadequate to resolve an appeal. See
McAlister, supra note 43, at 577-82 (arguing that courts should not use reasoning-throughincorporation where appellant has challenged the district court’s reasoning or otherwise responded
to district court decision on appeal). A handful of the decisions in the dataset offered reasoning only
by way of reference to a district court decision. See supra note 160 (identifying decisions that explain
outcome based on district court’s reasoning).
166 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (holding that a defense attorney can seek withdrawal from
representation if no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal exist provided that they conduct a full
examination of the proceedings before concluding that no grounds exist).
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Table 10: Word Count Data for Missing Decisions in First Circuit Dataset
Mean Word

Median

Highest

Lowest

Number of

Number of

Length of

Word

Word

Word

Judgments

Judgments

Judgement

Length of

Count

Count

with more

with between

than 500

250 and 500

words

words

30

49

Judgment

249

140

1950

24

Table 11: Citation Information for Missing Decisions in First Circuit Dataset
Mean Number of

Median Number of

Number of

Number of Anders

Citations to Caselaw

Citations to Caselaw

Decisions Without

Citations

Caselaw

2.5

1

51

28

The missing decisions were significantly more likely to involve pro se
appellants than was true for pro se terminations more generally in the First
Circuit during the same time period. For the twelve month period ending on
September 30, 2017, 467 of the 1,472 case terminations (including both merits and
procedural terminations) involved pro se litigants (or 31.7%).167 The First Circuit
had the lowest volume of pro se litigation across the circuits.168 In the dataset of
missing decisions, however, nearly half or 49.4% of terminations involved pro se
appellants. It was more than twice as likely that a missing judgment involved a
criminal appeal (67.1%) than was true for all merits terminations in the First
Circuit during the same time period (31.6% of merits terminations were
criminal).169 Table 12 describes the frequency of various categories of appeals
within our dataset of “missing” merits decisions in appeals as of right.

2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-9.
McAlister, supra note 43, at 555-59, fig.10 (discussing pro se appellate litigation across all circuits
and comparing the First Circuit’s relatively low 35.4% rate of appeals commenced by pro se plaintiffs).
169 2017 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, tbl.B-5.
167
168
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Table 12: Types of Appeals in First Circuit Missing Decisions Dataset (n=253)

Types
Number of Pro Se Appellants
Criminal Appeals (including
Motions to Vacate Sentence)
Number of Civil Rights Appeals
(including Employment)
Number of Prisoner Appeals
(including Habeas)
Number of Foreclosure Appeals
Immigration Appeals
Number of Bankruptcy Appeals
Number of Social Security and
Medicare Appeals

Number
125 (49.4% of all missing)
170 (67.1% of all missing)
30
16
5
4
4
2

Although some of the absolute numbers of these categories are not
particularly significant, together they account for 231 of the 253 missing
judgments, or 91.3%. Unfortunately, Administrative Office statistics are not
sufficiently granular to help us assess what overall percentage of terminations
in the First Circuit involve these categories of cases. Suffice it to say, however,
that only a handful (if any) of these missing decisions involve the kinds of
complex civil disputes that others have observed frequently receive the most
attention from the federal appellate courts.170 And none appeared to involve
cases that had proceeded to oral argument only to end in a missing decision;
these were all appeals that involved the minimum amount of appellate process
(briefing and decision).
Finally, to the extent that word count may be a meaningful proxy for
substance, it appears that the missing decisions from these categories of
cases—the categories identified in Table 12—are likely to be substantive.
Table 13 identifies the mean word count of missing decisions by nature of suit.
What’s striking is that even though the absolute numbers of missing decisions
in some categories are small (for example, for prisoner appeals and Social
Security/Medicare appeals), the mean word count suggests, again, that the
missing decisions themselves may have some value as reasoned precedent.

170 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 275-76 (describing the two-track system of
federal appellate process); see also Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 87, at 1668 & n.3 (2005) (same);
Pether, supra note 29, at 144, 1460-61 (criticizing less rigorous tracks of appellate decisionmaking).
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Table 13: Word Count by Nature of Suit in First Circuit Missing Decisions Dataset

Nature
Criminal (excluding Anders) (n=142)
Civil Rights (including Employment) (n=30)
Prisoner Appeals (including Habeas) (n=16)
Foreclosure Appeals (n=5)
Immigration Appeals (n=4)
Bankruptcy Appeals (n=4)
Social Security and Medicare Appeals (n=2)

Average Word Count
255.9
301.2
417.8
137.8
66.3
63.3
516.5

The First Circuit’s missing decisions may be exceptional; more work
should be done on missing decisions before we can extrapolate with confidence
based on the First Circuit example. But if the First Circuit is representative
of the problem, then we can no longer afford to ignore what’s missing.
III. WHY CARE?
Because the missing decisions involve unpublished decisions—decisions
that make no law and supposedly involve only routine issues171—some may be
less concerned that these decisions are “missing” from commercial databases.
Indeed, some may conclude the courts have curated the most helpful
precedent, thereby protecting us from information overload.
This Part makes the case for why we should care about missing decisions.
I will offer two reasons: access to precedent and access to systemic information
about the courts themselves. First, in a post–Rule 32.1 world where all
unpublished decisions are citable and have persuasive value,172 the
submergence of any useful circuit-level precedent is inexcusable. If the courts
are worried about information overload, that’s why search algorithms exist.
More problematic, in my view, is the risk that the submergence of certain kinds
of cases—civil rights and criminal appeals involving constitutional duties, in
particular—may have a distortion effect on the law. At least some of what’s
171

As one jurist explained,
Today, courts use unpublished opinions to issue quick, reasoned decisions in routine
cases based on settled precedent. For example, thousands of petitions to review
deportations and denials of Social Security benefits turn on discrete facts determined
by administrative law judges; hearing oral arguments and issuing published opinions
in most would only delay decisions that should be speedy.

William H. Pryor, Jr., Opinion, Conservatives Should Oppose Expanding the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/conservatives-expanding-federalcourts.html [https://perma.cc/P3LW-PHY3].
172 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
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missing reflects settled law that—if not for its relative invisibility—otherwise
might shape the rights of citizens and duties of state actors.173
Second, even if missing decisions offer little precedential value, the
missing decisions nevertheless contain and constitute essential information
about the federal appellate court system itself. Our inability to navigate
what’s missing thwarts any effort to assess the size, scope, and attributes of
the second (or third?) tier of federal appellate justice to which the courts
appear to shunt certain classes of litigants (pro se) and certain types of cases
(criminal) more often than others.
These are not the only reasons why the missing decisions matter; there
are other reasons why we should care, which I will only touch upon briefly.174
Limiting easy and useful access to any appellate level decision will have
distortion effects for both empiricists and practitioners—separate and apart
from the more normative concerns I address in this Part. This work reveals
significant sampling bias risks for empirical work at the circuit-level using
commercial databases—biases that researchers have acknowledged at the
district court level175 but may not have appreciated at the circuit level.176 For
practitioners, there are distortion effects as well. Appellate decisions not
included in commercial databases skew the procedural history information of
the district court decisions otherwise included in those databases. Precisely
for this reason, Lexis explained that it does not screen one-word affirmances
from its database: “[A] one-word affirmance would be highly valuable as part

173 See Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 119 (2019)
(“Modern civil rights litigation rests on the premise that law indeed becomes settled . . . . Citizens
may rely on the eminently reasonable assumption that officials will abide by settled law, and they
may seek compensation when officials fail to do so.”).
174 Some might also argue, persuasively, that missing decisions reflect a pedestrian example of
the problems with “secret law” that James J. Brudney, Deborah Jones Merritt, and Dakota S. Rudesill
have discussed. See Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J.
241, 308 n.233 (2015) (noting some less troubling forms of secret law, including private or confidential
legal documents); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 117 (2001) (arguing that limited
publication of judicial decisions inhibits the ability of parties to track variations in the application
of legal rules to fact sets).
175 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1214 (2013) (discussing incompleteness in Westlaw and Lexis’
databases for empirical work on district court decisions); Hoffman et al., supra note 14, at 686 (same);
see also McCuskey, supra note 16, at 522 (“It is well-documented that district-court opinions selected
for the print reporter volumes (the Federal Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions) may not be
representative of decision-making, and that therefore reliance solely on reported decisions to study
judicial behavior risks biased results.”).
176 See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 19, at 1182-83, 1183 n.97 (relying on Westlaw to conduct empirical
work on recusals by federal circuit judges and noting that a Westlaw representative “do[es] not believe there
are any U.S. Court of Appeals decisions that are not on Westlaw in some format”); see also supra note 20
(collecting statements assuming breadth of Westlaw and Lexis coverage for unpublished decisions).
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of the overall case history in Shepard’s.”177 Missing federal appellate decisions
thus may lead to inaccurate Shepard’s reports for district court decisions that
are otherwise available in commercial databases.
A. Meaningful Access to Precedent
Some of what’s missing has value as precedent. That is true, generally, of
unpublished decisions, which scholars have recognized are capable of making
“important contributions to common law” and sometimes vary little “in
complexity or importance” from their published counterparts.178 By now,
there’s widespread agreement that unpublished adjudications are worthy of
scholarly attention and that courts use unpublished adjudications in
meaningful—and sometimes deleterious—ways.179 Unpublished decisions are
not decisions we should ignore.
We have also abandoned the unsophisticated view of “precedent” that
adhered to the early use of unpublished decisions. Precedent is not an “all-ornothing proposition.”180 Thanks to Rule 32.1 (and the overwhelming scholarly
criticism that paved its way), we are now free, according to one scholar, “to
draw compelling analogies to nonbinding precedents,” even when courts label
those precedents “unpublished” or “non-precedential.”181
From this perspective—the perspective of those who defeated no-citation
bans and challenged their narrow conception of precedent—the discovery of
missing decisions raises the specter of a foe believed to have already been
vanquished. Navigable access to federal appellate decisions was a problem
that was thought to be solved long ago—and long before Rule 32.1 ensured
E-mail from Vicki K. Pyles, supra note 32.
Denise M. Keele, Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donalad W. Floyed & Lianjun Zhang, An
Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 213, 218 (2009).
179 See, e.g., Pether, supra note 29, at 1436 n.4 (examining effects of unpublication scheme on
litigants’ ability to manipulate precedent); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 275-76 (examining
deleterious effects of unpublication scheme on the behavior of judges, clerks, and litigants); Keele
et al., supra note 178, at 213 (recognizing that empiricists should take unpublished adjudications into
account because the “process of judicial decision making in the courts of appeals differs between
published and unpublished opinions” and cautioning scholars from “drawing conclusions from
examinations of published opinions alone”).
180 See Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 1235, 1236 (2004) (“[The] conception of precedent reflected in the no-citation rules appears
incomplete or distorted.”); see also Pether, supra note 29, at 1520 (“[Dissenting judges] conceived of
precedent broadly: ‘Each ruling, published or unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and
the application of law—to the case. Therefore, all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not,
and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citations.’” (quoting Rules
of Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., concurring and dissenting))).
181 Pearson, supra note 180, at 1236-37 (describing scholarly commentary on the practice of
“non-precedential precedent” in the federal appellate courts as “overwhelmingly negative”).
177
178
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that unpublished decisions could be used. Missing decisions are useful only
to the parties who know of their existence already, because the decisions are
unfindable using traditional legal research tools.
Although the courts lifted no-citation bans more than a decade ago, in
some circuits those citation bans remain, functionally speaking, if reams of
decisions never make their way to user-friendly commercial databases. A
decision like Jones v. Gelb,182 which began this Article, cannot be used if it is
not found or findable using traditional tools—unless, by chance, someone is
already aware of its existence. Some unpublished decisions, then, actually are
unpublished. Neither a law clerk nor a lawyer looking for cases involving
“pepper spray” in the First Circuit would ever find Jones v. Gelb.
Even so, are these missing decisions really worth finding? Are they useful
as “precedent,” however loosely defined? Take a look at the relevant portion
from Jones v. Gelb,183 the decision highlighted in the first paragraph of this
Article.184 The decision has more than 1,000 words, and, as to the portion of the
district court’s summary judgment decision that it vacated, the court explained:
After a thorough review of the record and of the parties’ submissions, we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Preliminarily, we note that we have reviewed the video of the August
2009 incident, but the video is of poor quality, and the interactions between
the plaintiff/appellant, Antonio Jones (“Jones”), and the officers present are
not always in full view; thus, the video is of limited usefulness at this stage.
We must review the rest of the record in the light most favorable to Jones
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor.
We conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of defendant/appellee Steven R. Legere (“Legere”) on Jones’ claim
that the use of pepper spray during the August 2009 incident infringed the
plaintiff ’s Eighth Amendment rights. According to Jones, while he was seated
on the ground in full arm and leg restraints (and having recently undergone
knee surgery), Legere sprayed him “multiple times” with pepper spray and
told him to “die quick.” We note that the video depiction of this incident does
not materially refute Jones’ description of the events (although it is not
adequate to confirm the key points of his claim, either). If a reasonable jury
were to accept these factual allegations as true, that jury might also conclude
that the use of force here was not part of a good faith effort to restore
discipline, i.e., to get Jones to stand on his own as instructed, and that,
instead, the force was used with a malicious purpose. If the leg and arm
182 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (discussing Jones); infra note 185 and
accompanying text (excerpting Jones).
183 Jones v. Gelb, No. 15-1680 (1st Cir. Mar. 23, 2017) (on file with author).
184 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.

1150

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1101

restraints—along with Jones’ post-surgical condition—left Jones physically
incapable of complying with Legere’s command to get up off the floor, a jury
might conclude that Legere could not reasonably have expected that applying
pepper spray would achieve the desired result, i.e., that it would cause Jones
to stand up willingly on his own. A jury might conclude, instead, that the
pepper spray was used for a malicious purpose, in that Legere’s alleged hostile
statement (“die quick”) suggests that Legere was motivated out of anger
and/or by an intention to inflict pain rather than to gain Jones’ compliance.
The fact that Jones apparently did not suffer a serious injury as a result
of this incident is not dispositive. “The ‘core judicial inquiry’ [is] ‘not whether
a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.” We cannot conclude at this stage of the
proceedings that Legere is entitled to qualified immunity, either.185

This is hardly a useless decision. Some may be surprised that such a
decision—especially one in favor of a prisoner on an Eighth Amendment
claim—has been rendered essentially useless by the First Circuit’s decisional
issuance scheme. Of course, not all “missing decisions” are as significant as
this one, but at least some are.186
Jones’s status as a “missing decision” may well have mattered to litigants
in the First Circuit, especially if subsequent litigation is any indication.
Whether use of force in the circumstances of Jones is malicious and thus
unconstitutional is a fact-sensitive, totality-of-the-circumstances question.187
In two appeals decided after Jones, the First Circuit found the circumstances
alleged wanting; it rejected two civil rights claims by incarcerated persons
who, like Mr. Jones, alleged unconstitutional use of pepper spray.188 Although
neither case is just like Jones, surely the litigants (and the court) might have
wanted the benefit of Jones when deciding whether other similar uses of force
to coerce compliance crossed the constitutional line.
All three decisions may have been right as a matter of fact and law, but the
inability of litigants, courts, and constitutional actors to have access to Jones is
a troubling problem. That the only decision favorable to the civil rights claimant
Jones, No. 15-1680, slip op. at 2 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
See also United States v. Bravo-Garcia, No. 16-1258, slip op. at 3 (1st Cir. July 10, 2017)
(vacating criminal sentence because procedurally unreasonable); Crawford v. Blue, No. 15-1545, slip
op. at 2 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 2016) (vacating decision in favor of pro se civil rights plaintiff); Bogosian
v. Hall, No. 15-1681, slip op. at 5 (1st Cir. Jan. 4, 2017) (vacating, in part, denial of motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity). Crawford and Bravo-Garcia have been reproduced in
their original form in Appendix B.
187 Staples v. Gerry, 923 F.3d 7, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756,
763 (4th Cir. 1996)).
188 Underwood v. Barrett, 924 F.3d 19, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2019); Staples, 923 F.3d at 17-18.
185
186
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is missing underscores the capacity of missing decisions to distort the law
itself—not simply frustrate our ability to access it. To proceed to trial, Mr. Jones
had to pierce the officer’s qualified immunity—that is, he needed to show that
the officer’s conduct violated law that was “clearly established” under “cases of
controlling authority” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”189 Alan
Trammell has described this as a “settled law” requirement; once the law
becomes “settled,” the violation of those settled rights and duties is actionable
in a federal civil rights suit.190 Section 1983, therefore, “imbues precedents with
binding significance in the real world.”191 Trammell explains further: “More
concretely, precedents create affirmative legal obligations for state officials,
even if those officials were not parties to the precedent-making lawsuits.”192
Were it not submerged, Jones would put corrections officers on notice of
their legal obligation not to inflict pain or use pepper spray on inmates out of
malice (irrespective of injury). Jones is not only evidence of what the law is;
it is the law in the First Circuit. And, apparently, no other case so holds,
because the First Circuit cited to Ninth Circuit precedent to support its
rejection of the officer’s qualified immunity claim.193 An issuance scheme that
frustrates access to a decision like Jones does far more than make it difficult
for some litigants to find useful precedent; it actually impedes a citizen’s
ability to vindicate his or her constitutional rights.
Lest one think I have placed too much weight on Jones, consider this
missing decision from the Seventh Circuit.194 In Bey v. Schwartz,195 the court
remanded a prisoner civil rights claim that the district court had wrongly
dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, which holds that a plaintiff may not use 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the validity of his conviction (impliedly or
otherwise).196 The court explained in a succinct order that Mr. Bey had not

189 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(explaining that the trial judge may appropriately determine whether the law was “clearly established”
on a motion for summary judgment related to the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct).
190 See Trammell, supra note 173, at 119; see also Alan M. Trammell, The Constitutionality of
Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 977, 988-89 (2020) (explaining that the law around
§ 1983 is settled and enforceable).
191 Trammell, supra note 190, at 989.
192 Id.
193 See Jones v. Gelb, No. 15-1680, slip op. at 2-3 (1st Cir. Mar. 23, 2017) (citing Furnace v.
Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1027-30 (9th Cir. 2013)). The Court also cited to Fourth Circuit, Tenth Circuit,
and Eighth Circuit decisions in support of its determination that Jones had supported his claim that
the officer’s action was motivated by malice or anger and not to obtain compliance. Id. at 2.
194 I am grateful to Joel Flaxman for bringing this example to my attention.
195 No. 12–1373, 2012 WL 13211886, at *1 (7th Cir. May 29, 2012). At some point after completing
this draft in 2020 and its publication in 2021, Westlaw added Bey to its database (presumably at the
request of a customer). Notably, many of the cases that cite to Bey in the district courts do so without
having a “WL” citation. See infra note 198 (collecting cases).
196 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994).
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run afoul of Heck because his contention was “that state prison officials held
him for longer than the state judiciary authorized,” which was “not a challenge
to the state court’s decisions”; rather, it was “an argument that the prison
system failed to implement the state courts’ decisions and thus defendants
have deprived him of liberty without due process of law.”197 Apparently, prison
officials may have a habit of detaining a prisoner for longer than authorized
by law in the Southern District of Illinois because Mr. Bey’s case has been
cited more than half a dozen times by judges in the Southern District of
Illinois evaluating the sufficiency of complaints raising similar claims.198 Bey’s
utility is plain, and it likely has evaded obscurity only because district court
decisions citing to it have made its reasoning accessible through Westlaw.199
At its core, the existence of missing decisions frustrates the reasons why
precedential constraint is desirable: fairness, efficiency, and predictability.200
The screening of decisions makes it difficult to determine whether our
appellate courts are treating like cases alike (fairness).201 It obscures useful
decisions from litigants, lower courts, and the public, leaving more work for
those applying the law in similar circumstances (efficiency). It leaves others
in the dark about how similar cases were, in fact, resolved (predictability).
The discovery of missing decisions, thus, reignites the concerns scholars
raised over “the accountability, consistency, predictability, and fairness” of
unpublished decisions that Rule 32.1 and the E-Government Act were meant
to address (at least in part).202 The presence and extent of missing decisions
suggest that both Rule 32.1 and the E-Government Act have failed to achieve
197 Bey, 2012 WL 13211886, at *1-2 (7th Cir. May 29, 2012). The Seventh Circuit later clarified
that the type of claim Mr. Bey raised is best analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. Childress v.
Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 438-39 (7th Cir. 2015).
198 Johnson v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 18–01790, 2018 WL 6438580, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Ill. Dec, 7,
2018); Evans v. IDOC, No. 17–763, 2018 WL 1757536, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2018); Evans v.
Illinois, No. 17–763, 2017 WL 5972998, at *2, *4 nn.2 & 4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2017); Dixson v. Foster,
No. 16-243, 2016 WL 3346055, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 16, 2016); Farris v. Party, No. 16–302, 2016 WL
3254514, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 14, 2016); West v. Waggoner, No. 16–189, 2016 WL 3254510, at *2 (S.D.
Ill. June 14, 2016); Mosley v. Davis, No. 14–775, 2014 WL 3734171, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 29, 2014).
199 One might say that, as a result, Bey isn’t “missing” after all. But imagine whether it would be findable
outside of the limited universe of the Southern District of Illinois, where it seems to have made the rounds.
200 See Schauer, supra note 91, at 595-96, 599 (explaining how precedential constraints on
judicial decisionmaking are rooted in fairness, predictability, and efficiency); see also Peter W.
Martin, Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, 53 VILL. L. REV. 1, 8
(2008) (“[P]recedent . . . not only induces consistency in adjudication, but also casts a long shadow
beyond. Precedent informs private decisions about whether to litigate, how to structure negotiated
settlements or business transactions, and whether and, if so, how to proceed with other activities
posing potential legal consequences or risks.”).
201 See also Hellman Statement, supra note 57 (arguing that access to unpublished decisions
ensures that “courts satisfy their obligations of accountability”).
202 See Pether, supra note 29, at 1486-87 (discussing perils of “private judging” resulting from
unpublished decision practices, including risk that “similarly situated litigants [are] being treated differently”).
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their most fundamental transparency goals, depriving litigants, scholars, and
the courts of access to useful precedent in the process.
I have, of course, highlighted particularly powerful examples of valuable
missing decisions—and I’ve included a few more in Appendix B. Some may
wonder—especially given that so many missing decisions affirm the district
court’s decision203—whether many missing decisions actually have
precedential value. The appellate-level reasoning that is “missing” may well
be duplicative of reasoning that’s already out there—either in other published
or visible unpublished decisions or, perhaps, in the lower court decision that
the missing decision affirms. The latter is a problematic assumption, given
the well-documented access issues for district court decisions that Boyd, Kim,
and Schlanger recently explored.204 And while some—and perhaps even
many—missing decisions likely are duplicative of reasoning already available
to us in other forms, that’s surely not always the case, as Bey and Jones both
illustrate (the former becoming useful precedent in the Southern District of
Illinois and the latter relying chiefly on out-of-circuit precedent to defend its
result). More generally, we cannot assume that affirmances merely reiterate
what has occurred below, because appellate courts remain free to affirm on
any basis appearing in the record.205
Given, moreover, how case- and fact-specific many affirmances may be—
especially in certain areas of the law, including qualified immunity
dispositions—the affirmance itself has value in its context. It may demonstrate
approval of the district court’s reasoning—either in whole or in part.
Understanding the scope of that approval has value; for example, in the qualified
immunity context, the reviewing court may agree only that a constitutional right
was not clearly established—choosing not to endorse a district court’s view of
the underlying constitutional issue (assuming one may have been given).206 If
the appellate-level decision is not easily locatable or readily usable but the
district court decision is, bench and bar alike might wrongly assume that the
district court decision reflects an accurate view of the law. This might create
fertile ground for what Maggie Gardner has recently identified as “dangerous
citations”—that is, “error introduced in district court opinions” that later gets
picked up and reused in district courts and (worse, yet) appellate courts.207
See supra Table 9.
See Boyd et al., supra note 14, at 489 (“[T]here is significant variation in the types of cases
and motion activity that are visible across data sources, and those differences will often lead to
differing conclusions about those cases and about judicial behavior.”).
205 See, e.g., Ross–Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 217 F.3d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“Moreover, we do not consider ourselves bound by the trial court’s rationale, but may affirm its
judgment for any valid reason that finds support in the record.”).
206 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling mandatory sequencing of legal
questions to resolve qualified immunity issues).
207 Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2020).
203
204
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B. Missing Decisions as “Systemic Facts”
Irrespective of their utility as precedent, the missing decisions matter still.
They are facts about the federal appellate system itself—that is, these are what
Andrew Crespo calls “systemic facts.”208 This new category of judicial factual
material involves facts that are neither adjudicative nor legislative, as Kenneth
Culp Davis famously described.209 Unlike their more well-known counterparts,
“systemic facts” concern “broader phenomena” about “the judiciary itself”;
these facts permit the courts—and the parties who use them—to “look inward”
at the system.210 Such facts may be marshalled as an institutional check on the
system, too211—but only if we enjoy meaningful access to them.
Collectively, the missing decisions represent a significant percentage of the
federal appellate courts’ merits docket—indeed, nearly thirty percent in most
years over the last decade.212 Even where the decisions themselves may not
have persuasive value, together, the missing decisions are a rich reservoir of
data about how the federal courts adjudicate certain types of appeals—
especially those appeals affecting the least popular and most disfavored
litigants in the federal system. These decisions are missing, in part, because no
one has cared to look for them—a reality that only underscores the need to
208

He elaborates:
[Systemic facts] are neither narrowly transactional, like adjudicative facts, nor foreign
and external to the decisionmaker, like the archetypal legislative fact. . . . [They]
account for information with respect to which a given decisionmaking institution enjoys
deep institutional familiarity, privileged (or perhaps even exclusive) access, or both.

Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 2049, 2067-68 (2016)
209 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV.
945, 952 (1955) (explaining further the difference between legislative and adjudicative facts).
“Adjudicative facts” concern the “immediate parties” and the events and circumstances of the case
itself. Crespo, supra note 208, at 2066 (internal quotation marks omitted). Legislative facts, on the
other hand, are “general,” concerned with “social and economic data” about the world beyond
courthouse wall, including, for example, facts about the “psychological effects of racial segregation
on minorities,” the “relative safety of surgical procedures,” and the “sociological consequences of
same-sex parenting.” Id. at 2066 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 Crespo, supra note 208, at 2052.
211 Crespo’s work focuses on the capacity of criminal trial courts to marshal systemic facts in
constitutional criminal adjudication to combat transactional myopia and enable criminal courts to
achieve greater institutional awareness. See generally id. Crespo does suggest, however, that systemic
factfinding “could illuminate important institutional attributes of . . . [the] courts themselves.” Id. at
2101 n.227. He offers two possibilities: “racial disparities related to the protocols [courts] use to
compose jury venire pools, or [court] compliance with statutory or constitutional speedy trial
guarantees.” Id. I use Crespo’s frame more generically here to refer to the body of data that courts as
institutions acquire in processing any stream of cases—not just criminal cases and not just trial-level
dispositions and processes. Appellate courts possess data capable of generating systemic facts, too.
212 See generally Appendix A.
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examine what the missing decisions themselves say about how the federal
appellate system administers justice.
The federal courts of appeals have been sorting their output in ways that
promote and give greater access to decisions that impact the most powerful in
our system: well-lawyered disputes involving complex and interesting legal
questions end in easily accessible published opinions. That observation, as a
general matter, is not new. More than twenty years ago, scholars exposed the
creation of a two-tier system of appellate justice, which benefits the haves at
the sake of the have-nots.213 In a capstone to the most probing work done to
date on unpublished decisions, William Richman and William Reynolds
observed: “Our thirty-plus years of study have left us with anger and despair
over the creation and jealous maintenance of a system that underserves the
nation and shortchanges the poor and powerless.”214 Penelope Pether similarly
argued that “unpublication does the work of structural subordination.”215
This Article underscores the urgency of these assertions and reveals our
inability—at present—to evaluate these charges. It also raises the more troubling
possibility that the courts have been complicit in—or, worse, perpetrators of—
systemic subordination. But we cannot investigate such a serious charge without
easy and navigable access to the decisions that affect the system’s most vulnerable
and least powerful. Earlier efforts to address these questions have been
incomplete; we have always only seen about seventy percent of the canvas.
The missing decisions likewise are relevant to assessing how sloppy some of the
work of the federal appellate system has become.216 We’ve never had easy access to
what are undoubtedly the poorest of the poor decisions, making any systemwide
assessment of the quality of the courts’ work nearly impossible. The courts’
decisional procedures have enacted roadblocks—or at least speedbumps—to
academic efforts to scrutinize and navigate the second tier of federal appellate
process. Richman and Reynolds have warned that “the poor quality of so many
unpublished opinions provides stark evidence that there has been a systemic

213 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 275-76 (describing two-tier system of federal
appellate process); see also McAlister, supra note 43, at 547-48 (discussing the two-tier system).
214 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20, at ix.
215 Pether, supra note 29, at 1521.
216 For example, Richman & Reynolds have noted that

[i]n addition to the systemic and structural costs exacted by the courts’ strategy of reducing
appellate process in order to accommodate caseload, there is a significant cost in quality as
well . . . . Moreover, the poor quality of so many unpublished opinions provides stark
evidence that there has been a systemic breakdown in the work product of the circuit courts.
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20, at 120-21; see also McAlister, supra note 43, at 537 (“[T]he
creation of the unpublished decision has led to pervasive decisional atrophy—atrophy that has been
lamented but largely unexamined.”).
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breakdown in the work product of the circuit courts.”217 Navigable access is essential
to any examination of the quality of the court’s work at an institutional level.
Consider another way in which the missing decisions might serve as
“systemic facts.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued
a remarkable set of opinions in March 2019,218 revealing profound internal
disagreement over its publication practices for requests to file second or
successive habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) and § 2244.219 The
controversy involved a high volume of petitions (over 2,200) seeking relief
under Johnson v. United States,220 which had held a portion of the Armed
Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague, and under Welch v. United
States,221 which had made Johnson fully retroactive. Apparently in an effort to
regulate the practice within the Eleventh Circuit, panels began publishing
decisions resolving certain of these requests.222 In the process, the court made
law that bound future panels and, in the view of some members of the court,
it did so undesirably and unfairly.223 These concerns were heightened because
of the limited adversarial nature of the requests to file second or successive
habeas petitions under § 2255(h) and § 2244(b).224
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 20, at 121.
See United States v. St. Hubert, 918 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc); id. at 1174 (Tjoflat,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1179 (Jordan, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc); id. at 1196 (Wilson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at
1199 (Martin, J. dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
219 Federal appellate courts may authorize the filing of second or successive habeas petitions when
the petition raises a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” to the federal habeas petitioner. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). To seek permission to file a successive petition under § 2255(h), the habeas petitioner files a
request in the applicable circuit court of appeals. § 2244(b)(3). A three-judge panel reviews the request
and grants permission for the filing “if [the panel] determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” § 2244(b)(3)(B)–(C). The
court is supposed to act on the request within thirty days, § 2244(b)(3)(D), and the decision “shall not
be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” § 2244(b)(3)(D)–(E).
220 576 U.S. 591, 597-98 (2015).
221 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). It is worth pointing out that the lower court’s decision in Welch was
itself a “missing decision”—a single-judge order by a judge on the Eleventh Circuit denying a
certificate of appealability. See Welch v. United States, No. 14-15733 (11th Cir. June 9, 2015).
222 See St. Hubert, 918 F.3d at 1179 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In
2016 after the Johnson and Welch decisions, there was a heightened need to publish at least some of these
2,282 orders to establish precedent, to provide consistency in panel rulings in so many cases, and to
facilitate the administration of these matters.”). Judge Tjoflat’s explanation as to the need for consistency
in administering the requests likewise suggests the importance of navigable access to these decisions to
enable the court, the public, and academics to evaluate the evenhanded administration of this process.
223 See id. at 1207-08 (Martin, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[I]t is not
the number of published opinions I take issue with. I take issue with the practice itself. As Mr. St.
Hubert’s case illustrates, any one published order that prematurely and in my view mistakenly
resolves an open merits question forecloses that issue for all future panels.”).
224 See id. at 1210 (explaining that published decisions on second or successive petitions did
not have “the usual robust process that ordinarily attends our Circuit precedent”); see also id. at 1191
217
218
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Although the sharp disagreement among members of the court focused on
the use of published orders to bind, lurking in the background was the specter
of what had happened to the rest of the 2,000 decisions that the court had not
published. Indeed, we see a glimpse in Judge Beverly Martin’s dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc on the use of published orders: she discussed the
case of Stoney Lester, whose request for permission to proceed with a
successive petition had been granted in an unpublished order.225 There’s no
commercial database citation for the Lester decision; it’s a missing decision. But
Martin deploys it as a kind of systemic fact that would have been lost otherwise
to those outside the court—that is, to those who had not been responsible
(personally) for the court’s review of more than 2,000 similar requests. She
offered Mr. Lester’s case as an “example of . . . how our get-permission process
should operate.”226 The irony should not be lost: the published decisions on the
successive petitions approval process undesirably bound the Eleventh Circuit,
some judges argued, while “missing decisions” were held up, instead, as
compelling examples of how the process should have operated.
Martin’s use of a missing decision to challenge her colleague’s approach to
the second or successive process foreshadows an important objection to the
solution discussed in the next Part. Some judges may find strategic advantage
in issuing decisions under the radar of disagreeing colleagues. Indeed, such
decisions may serve valuable institutional aims, permitting panels, as I have
explained, to “avoid”227 (temporarily or not) controversial or thorny issues
over which there is only high-level agreement as to outcome.228 Exposing
those decisions by making them widely and freely available might have
unintended consequences and restrict appellate panels from doing justice
when they are reluctant to make law.
That argument should garner some sympathy; such use of unpublished
decisions may be the least problematic for reasons discussed elsewhere.229 I
(Jordan, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that court might decide such
orders are binding “only when there has been adversarial briefing”).
225 Id. at 1203 (“I offer the example of a case brought by a man named Stony Lester, because it
illustrates how our get-permission process should operate. See In re Stoney Lester, No. 16-11730-A,
slip op [(May 19, 2016)]. Mr. Lester sought leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion in light
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson.”).
226 Id.
227 See McAlister, supra note 43, at 574 (explaining that “avoidant decisions” are “facially underreasoned decisions” that “bear[] the features of ordinary appellate process, including oral argument
and counsel” but result in decisions that “say[] very little, and may slip below the radar” as
“perfunctory unpublished decision[s]—perhaps precisely as the ‘avoidant’ panel intended”).
“Avoidant” unpublished decisions usually involve thorny, novel, important, or complex issues over
which there may be panel agreement as to outcome but not as to reasoning. Id. at 586.
228 See id. at 588-89 (identifying “limited role for avoidant decisions” and “find[ing] room for
some avoidant decisions in an unpublication scheme”).
229 See id. at 586-88 (describing legitimate use of unpublished decisions to avoid issues).
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do not argue here for a transparency mandate in reason giving—that is, that
courts always explain themselves. Instead, I ask only that courts make their
results easily and freely navigable. That more limited type of transparency
does not require courts to abandon practices that may serve weighty
institutional interests or permit case-specific decisions in the interests of
justice. But we should have free and usable access to those results. Indeed,
without it, instances where courts have employed corrective justice may lead
to inconsistent and unfair justice. Why should one litigant benefit from relief
in strikingly similar circumstances and the other not have navigable access to
that decision so that she may argue for the same result?
Finally, this Article has largely assumed that decisions “go” missing—not
that they are intentionally hidden by the courts or by the authoring judges. But
what if that’s not the case? What if, instead, courts have developed a decisional
issuance scheme that ensures that some decisions are harder to find, thus shaping
public perception of the court’s work—whether by obscuring access to its most
poorly reasoned work or, perhaps, by making certain classes of decisions harder
to find (for example, cases like Jones and Bey)? That possibility echoes the
concerns about judicial discretion—here deployed to make only certain decisions
visible, depending on what kind of order the court uses to resolve the appeal—
that others have raised about the use of unpublished decisions to avoid
establishing constitutional rights for civil rights plaintiffs.230 And were it true, it
would only underscore the urgency of a solution, which I turn to next.
IV. THE SOLUTION
The problem of missing decisions has a solution within easy reach of both
the commercial databases and the federal appellate courts. But, for reasons
explained in this Part, the solution likely must come from the courts themselves.
They are responsible for the scheme that limits free access to their decisional
output on court websites. Although the courts may have been unaware of how
that scheme affects navigable access to decisions in commercial databases, now
that they are aware, the courts are in the best position to fix the problem.
First, however, consider why commercial databases may not solve the
problem of missing decisions on their own. Although the databases respond
to consumer demand to add material, if I’m right that the class of “missing
decisions” involves the least powerful and popular litigants, it seems highly
unlikely that market forces will fix these access and navigation problems. The
class of cases that are missing are not the ones that the highest paying users of
230 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 62,
115-16 (2016) (finding that nearly twenty percent of decisions recognizing new constitutional rights
are unpublished and arguing that discretion with respect to the qualified immunity inquiry and the
decision whether to publish leads to observable strategic behavior by appellate panels).
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commercial databases—i.e., private attorneys and large law firms—usually are
looking to retrieve.231 What’s missing are the decisions that the free or
reduced-fee users of commercial databases are most likely to need or seek
(including those working on behalf of criminal defendants in federal
defenders’ offices, law clerks and court staff, other nonprofit lawyers, pro se
litigants, and academics). The point is: the paying customers may not push the
databases to incur costs to recover missing decisions, and their absence most
significantly affects those who pay the least (or not at all) for access. The users
most affected by the missing decisions are not those who can move the market.
That said, the commercial databases of course could take significant steps
to address the problem—and I urge them to do so. That substantive decisions
are missing may be deeply concerning; that the commercial databases who
profit from their control of our law have not incurred the expense or
undertaken the effort to ensure the completeness of their databases is also
troubling. The debate over the wisdom and propriety of the commercial
databases’ stranglehold on our law are beyond the scope of this work,232 but
this Article offers yet another example of the costs of such a system. I hope
my work may provide a template for how these databases can ensure that they
recover what has been lost—at least going back to January 1, 2007, the date
after which all that is missing is usable as persuasive law in every circuit.
For these reasons, the fix likely must come from the courts. Not only are
the courts best positioned to solve the problem, but they are also responsible
for it. The courts have failed to live up to the promise of—and arguably failed
to comply with—the E-Government Act itself. The Act left each federal
court to fend for itself at the direction of its respective chief judge233—
inviting the kind of disparate schemes this Article identifies.234

231 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in A Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law Schools,
and the Legal Information Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 797, 830-31 (2006) (“Lexis and Westlaw
services are particularly suited to large law firms that bill clients. The high costs of Lexis and
Westlaw, however, means that users in certain market segments may not be able to pay the prices
that Lexis and Westlaw charge under their traditional pricing models.”).
232 See generally Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We Must Restore
Public Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 206 (2019) (explaining how
publication has merged with “ownership” of law in the United States and identifying harms from
publishers’ use of “powerful legal tools to control who has access to the text of the law, how much
they must pay, and under what terms”).
233 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (explaining that “[t]he Chief Justice . . . shall cause to be established and
maintained, for the court of which the judge is chief justice or judge, a website” with written opinions).
Chief judges—a rotating and temporary position, see 28 U.S.C. § 45(3)(A)—are the “chief administrative
leaders for their individual circuits.” Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek,
The Role and Impact of Chief Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 91, 91 (2003).
234 See Martin, supra note 16, at 313 (tasking each chief judge with ensuring compliance “invited
a wide range of methods and degrees of compliance”).
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In the short term, I urge the Judicial Conference—the policy-making branch
of the federal courts—to charge the Chief Judges of each circuit with ensuring free
public access to all unsealed final, judge-issued decisions from the federal appellate
courts.235 The Chief Justice of the United States chairs the Judicial Conference,236
and he has initiated policy-reform efforts on the part of the Judicial Conference
and the Administrative Office before.237 He has the power to do so again.
The Judicial Conference also can fix the problem of missing decisions by
issuing new guidance that expansively construes the courts’ obligations under
the E-Government Act. Wayward early guidance under the E-Government
Act may be partly (or even entirely) to blame for missing decisions.238 That
guidance essentially determined that the then-in-development PACER
system “may be used to satisfy” the Act’s “searchability” requirement for
access to the “substance” of court opinions.239 PACER, in turn, gives free
access to certain court orders—but only those designated as “written
opinions” consistent with the E-Government Act. 240

235 This is not a new call—at least with respect to all unpublished decisions. Arthur Hellman
persuasively argued to Congress nearly two decades ago that “all of the courts of appeals should
make their unpublished dispositions available in electronic form to publishers and other information
providers.” Hellman Statement, supra note 57. Regardless of whether the decisions are citable as
precedent, Hellman explained, “the legal community and other citizens have a strong interest in
knowing how the courts are carrying out their work of resolving disputes and applying the law.” Id.
236 See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUST. OF THE U.S., 2018 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 6 http://supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2018year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SFR-UVPF] [hereinafter 2018 YEAR-END REPORT] (explaining that the Chief
Justice chairs the Judicial Conference of the United States).
237 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUST. OF THE U.S., 2017 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, at 11 http://supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2017year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MY4B-SQ9E] (directing the “Director of the Administrative Office to assemble a working group to
examine our practices and address [sexual harassment] issues”); see also 2018 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note
236, at 6-7 (describing Judicial Conference working group on sexual harassment policies).
238 Memorandum from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Dir., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Regarding
Compliance with Website Requirements of the E-Government Act, to All Chief Judges, U.S. Courts
2 (Nov. 10, 2004), http://www.access-to-law.com/pacer/AO_Mecham_memo_Nov2004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8CR-UZAS] [hereinafter “Mecham Memorandum”] (clarifying the initial guidance
on written opinions for the E-Government Act).
239 Id. (“A combination of CM/ECF and the PACER systems may be used to satisfy the
searchability requirement, as these systems allow for searching within a document.”).
240 As Peter Martin has explained:

In response to the E-Government Act, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
operating under Judicial Conference guidance, issued a new version of the CM/ECF
software that, once installed by a court, incorporated two changes that applied to all
documents in its system tagged as a ‘written opinion.’ The first exempted all
documents so designated from PACER fees. . . . [A] second and more important
change to PACER was the addition of a ‘Written Opinions Report.’ This operates
only at the individual court level.
Martin, supra note 16, at 320
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The “official guidance” left “written opinion” designation choices up to the
“authoring judge”; she was responsible—through direction to a “user filing on
behalf of a judge”—for determining whether a particular decision satisfied the
Act’s “written opinion” threshold.241 On the one hand, the authoring judge was
told that a “written opinion” was “any document issued by a judge or judges
of the court, sitting in that capacity, that sets forth a reasoned explanation for
a court’s decision.”242 On the other hand, for appellate courts, “only those
documents designated as opinions of the court”—an undefined term—“meet
the definition of ‘written opinion.’”243 Rather than mandate access to all final
orders or opinions, or even just to all reasoned decisions, the Judicial
Conference devolved these designation decisions to individual judges.
Whatever hopes we may have had for the E-Government Act, individual
compliance determinations and decisional issuance schemes have effectively
thwarted widespread, free, and navigable access to all federal appellate decisions.
How much each court makes available for free on its website is a decision left
entirely to each individual court, authoring judge, or administrative clerk filing
each respective decision. That must change to solve the problem of missing
decisions, and updates to the 2004 guidance is a good place to start.244
Another solution would be to make PACER free; indeed, this work may
provide yet another reason why PACER should be free and reformed for
enhanced usability.245 But privacy issues related to personally sensitive
information in court-filed documents loom large in that debate.246 My
proposal, thus, is more narrowly drawn to avoid privacy concerns over
241 Mecham Memorandum, supra note 238, at 3 (“CM/ECF will be modified to ask a user filing
on behalf of a judge whether the document being filed meets the definition of ‘written opinion’ at
the time of docketing in CM/ECF.”).
242 Id. at 2. The guidance clarified that “routine, non-substantive orders” were not “written
opinions.” Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 3.
245 As of February 2019, Congress was considering bipartisan legislation to do away with
PACER’s paywall. See Patrick L. Gregory, PACER’s Court Records Should Be Free Lawmakers Say,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 13, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/bipartisanbill-introduced-to-make-pacer-docs-free [https://perma.cc/2U7P-V5CR]; Seamus Hughes, The Federal
Courts Are Running an Online Scam, POLITICO (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2019/03/20/pacer-court-records-225821 [https://perma.cc/P4W7-M6PL].
Litigation over PACER’s fees and how the judiciary spends those fees is ongoing. See, e.g., Nat’l
Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 3d 123 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that use of
PACER fees to fund certain judiciary projects exceeded congressional authorization for use of fees), aff ’d
968 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that fees must be limited to the expenses “incurred in services
providing public access”); Perry Cooper, Federal Circuit Hammers Government on Use of PACER Fees,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 3, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/federal-circuit-hammersgovernment-on-use-of-pacer-fees [https://perma.cc/4RLV-LXFG]; Adam Liptak, Attacking a Pay Wall That
Hides Public Court Filings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/us/politics/pacerfees-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/YB42-BDXY].
246 See, e.g., Schultze, supra note 67, at 1205-09 (discussing privacy concerns with free PACER).
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whether and how to free PACER from its restrictive paywall. I propose,
instead, that the Judicial Conference issue guidance requiring courts to make
all judge-issued unsealed decisions, which are already stripped of personally
sensitive information, freely available on court websites.
Why insist on access to all judge-issued final decisions and not, more
limitedly, all reasoned final decisions? The discovery of missing decisions calls
into question the courts’ ability to make slippery choices between what is
reasoned and what is not. If the courts have decided that some decisions are
simply not reasoned enough to be helpful to litigants, they are not careful in
that inquiry if decisions like Jones v. Gelb slip through the cracks. Better to
have access to all decisions; technology can separate wheat from chaff.247
I would limit my proposal in one respect: courts need not make available all
procedural terminations on court websites for free; they only need to ensure
robust access to those procedural terminations that result from court, rather
than clerk, action. Many procedural terminations may have little public value
(for example, voluntary dismissals and dismissals for failure to prosecute).248
For that reason, I propose requiring courts to make only judge-issued (as
opposed to clerk-ordered) procedural terminations, which would include any
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, publicly and freely available. Judge-ordered
terminations of all types should be available on court websites.
There’s another reason to insist on broad free access—a reason that takes a
less charitable view of the courts. It’s possible that the federal appellate court’s
decisional scheme has developed by design. Some federal appellate judges
expressed strong opposition to Rule 32.1 and its liberalized reliance on
unpublished decisions.249 Decisional issuance schemes—and the selective free
access that they entail—may be the contemporary equivalent of a no-citation ban.
Future work should plumb this issue. For now, fears of court complicity or, worse,
court instigation, should strengthen the call for a broad free-access mandate.
It also strengthens the call for congressional action. To ensure access to
court decisions irrespective of any Judicial Conference action, Congress
should consider legislation requiring free, public access in a keywordsearchable form to all final judicial decisions of the federal appellate courts.
The Government Printing Office’s existing consolidated federal court

247 See Martin, supra note 200, at 44 (arguing that “[t]he rapid development of sophisticated Internet
search tools provides strong evidence that with the right combination of public sector involvement and private
sector competition in the dissemination of legal information, [information overload] need not occur”).
248 See supra notes 107–112 and accompanying text (discussing types of procedural terminations).
249 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, FED.
LAW., June 2004, at 36, 37 (“When the people making the sausage [i.e., unpublished decisions] tell
you it’s not safe for human consumption, it seems strange indeed to have a committee in Washington
tell people to go ahead and eat it [i.e., cite to them] anyway.”).
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opinions database, FDsys, could be used to provide that free, keywordsearchable access to the work of the federal appellate courts.
All of these solutions are not just technically feasible—indeed, the
technical infrastructure already exists—but the federal courts make more than
enough money off of the PACER system fees to pay for these reforms.250 It
is past time that the U.S. Courts of Appeals ensure meaningful, complete,
and free access to their work product—to our law.
CONCLUSION
Core assumptions about our ability to use technology to access and
navigate useful precedent from the federal appellate courts are not—and never
have been—true. The courts are best positioned to eliminate accessibility and
usability issues once and for all. Given the sophistication of technological tools
to filter and isolate useful precedent, we should worry less about information
overload and worry more about our ability to access, scrutinize, and use the
entire work of the federal appellate courts. What’s missing may well affect
those who litigate the most but who are the least likely to effect change in
institutional design. Let this work be the beginning of the solution.

250 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Paying for Public Records, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 13, 2019, 11:15 AM),
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2019/02/paying-for-public-records.html [https://perma.cc/
3GJ6-TPZC] (reporting that while PACER charges a fee of $0.10 per page, the estimated cost of retrieving
a page is estimated to be “only $0.0000006 per page” and that PACER “brought in more than $146 million
in fees during the 2016 fiscal year, even though it cost just over $3 million to operate” (quoting Corrected
Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program, 968 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(Nos. 19-1081(L), 19-1083); Matt Ford, The Courts Are Making a Killing on Public Records, NEW REPUBLIC
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/153003/courts-making-killing-public-records-pacer-fees
[https://perma.cc/A2VD-E7AK]).
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APPENDIX A

What follows are figures depicting (1) the maximum possible percentage
of available merits terminations across all geographic federal appellate courts
in each twelve-month period ending on September 30 between 2008 and 2016;
and (2) the maximum possible percentage of available merits terminations per
circuit in each twelve-month period ending on September 30 between 2016
and 2008. Similar figures for the twelve-month period ending on September
30, 2018 and September 30, 2017 appear in the body of the Article.
Figure 1.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations for Each Database in 2016
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Figure 1.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2016
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Figure 2.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Database in 2015
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Figure 2.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2015
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Figure 3.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Database in 2014
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Figure 3.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2014
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Figure 4.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Database in 2013
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Figure 4.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2013
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Figure 5.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in
Each Database in 2012
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Figure 5.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2012
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Figure 6.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in
Each Database in 2011
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Figure 6.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2011
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Figure 7.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in
Each Database in 2010
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Figure 7.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2010
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Figure 8.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in
Each Database in 2009
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Figure 8.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2009
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Figure 9.1: Maximum Possible Percentage of Available Merits Terminations in
Each Database in 2008
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Figure 9.2: Maximum Possible Percentage of Coverage for Merits
Terminations in Each Circuit in 2008
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APPENDIX B
What follows are two examples of “missing decisions” from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued during the 2016 to 2017
Administrative Office Reporting cycle.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1258
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANGELITA BRAVO-GARCÍA,
Defendant, Appellant.
Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
Entered: July 10, 2017
Defendant-appellant Angelita Bravo-García ("Bravo") was indicted for possession of
ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). She pled guilty without
a plea agreement. Bravo's Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") established a Base Offense Level
("BOL") of 20 for violating 18 U.S.C § 922 with a prior "controlled substance offense," pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (defining "controlled substance
offense"). Her Total Offense Level was calculated to be 18, given a two-level decrease for
acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); The PSR also assigned Bravo a Criminal
History Category of III. Combined, these gave Bravo an advisory Guidelines sentencing range
of thirty-three to forty-one months of imprisonment.
Bravo objected to the calculation of her BOL and challenges her sentence in this appeal,
arguing that none of her prior convictions qualify as a "controlled substance offense" as defined
by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) and that her sentence should not therefore be enhanced.1 Bravo argued
1

Bravo also argues that the district court erred in imposing a nighttime curfew and electronic
monitoring for six months as special conditions of her supervised release. Because we remand
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